

THE
NATURE
OF
TRUTH

Its Union and Unity
with the SOUL,

Which is
One in its Essence, Faculties,
Acts; One with TRUTH.

Discussed by the Right Honorable
ROBERT Lord BROOK,
in a Letter to a private Friend.

By whom it is now published for
the Publick Good.

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Duck-lane, 1641.





THE
P R E F A C E

to the Reader, Shewing
what first gave
Birth to This Discourse
of TRUTH.

READER,



ithout an Epithet : for,
you must
expect no

complements. I am
now a Pleader, and so
am forbid προμαΐζειν or
ἐξω τι λέγειν : Yet, with
Submission to That Se-

A 4

vere

The Preface

* *Areopagus* : for,
such were
the orders
for all
Pleaders
there: *A-*
rifotel.
Rhet. lib. 1
Lucian. in.
Anacharf.

vere Court*, I hope
'twill be no offence, by
breaking their First. In-
junction, to keepe their
Second. One Word
then by way of Preface,
may perhaps not seeme
unseasonable, unne-
cessary, and so not ἐξω
τῷ πράγματι.

☼ This Divine Dis-
course of *Truth*, com-
ming to me, from so
Noble an Hand; I could
not envy it the Publique
Light: For, what heart
could indure to stifle
such a *Beauty*, at its first
Birth, at its first Breath?
Nay, though Cruelty
should

to the Reader.

Should scorne to take a
check, yet Power it selfe,
might plead impotent,
for such an Act. For,
where, or *who* is He, that
can resist the struglings
of Divine *Truth*, forcing
its way out from the
Wombe of Eternity?
Where, or who is Hee
that by a Viperous
wreache*, or other as-
sault, can smother *Her-*
cules, though yet but
sprawling in his cradle?
View then This new-
borne *Beauty*; mark its
Feature, proportion,
lineaments; Tell mee
now, was Its Birth an

A 5 object

* With
such, *I know*
assay'd to
kill *Hercu-*
les in his
cradle, as
the Poets
say.

The Preface

object of pity? or rather of envy? at least admiration; for, Envy findes no place in Noble spirits.

One thing yet, I must excuse (which yet indeed needs no excuse)
A *Second* Conception is here *First* borne; yet not *Abortive*; no, but by mature thoughts , 'tis againe decreed, the elder shall serve the younger. For, *That* was meant the *Act*, *This* but the *Prologue*, ushering in That yet more curious Concept (if such be possible) which was an *Embryo* before

to the Reader.

before This, but is yet
Vnborne.

The truth is, This
Noble Lord (the Au-
thor of this following
Discourse) having di-
ved deep in those Pro-
phetick Mysteries (at
which his first times
glance, in this) was e-
ven forced (by that oc-
casion) upon a more
exact and abstract spe-
culation of *Truth* it selfe;
naked *Truth*, as in her
selfe, without her gown,
without her crown.

Matth. 24.
Apocal. 20

At first view, hee saw
her sparkle with most
glorious luster; But her
Rayes

The Preface

Rayes daz'led his eyes,
so that he durst not, hee
could not, enough be-
hold, admire, and adore,
her perfect Beauty, ex-
act Proportion, Divine
Harmony; yet though
daz'led, he viewed still;
remembering that of the
Arcopagite *, *Earthly*
Bodies are best seene in,
and by, Light; But Spi-
rituall Beauties, in δια-
σφαιρα, in, and by, Divine
Clouds, Divine Dark-
nesse. This, This is the
best Perspective to Di-
vine Objects; and the
Brightest Starres shine
best, sparkle most, in
the

Dionys. de
Divinis No-
minib.

to the Reader.

the Darkest, the Blackest
Night.

That which ravisht
his Soule most, and
most inforc'd him more
to pry, to adore more,
Was, the experience of
that which Plato speaks:
*When our Soules (saith
he) glance first upon Di-
vine Light, they are soon
ravisht, and cannot but pry
more and more, because
in it they see* *Σύγγενος* *τι,*
*somewhat of Kin to them-
selves. And this Kindred,
if I mistake not, is the
neerest possible; more
then Consanguinity; I
had almost said more
then*

*Epist. ad
Dionys.*

The Preface

See Plato's
Parmenid.
& Timæus.

then *Identity* it selfe. For, alas, that *Corporal Union* in Materials, which we miscall sometimes *Identity*, is at best but a cold touch in a point or two; a most disdainful embrace (at greatest distance) in those Beings which have much ἑτερον, and but little ὁμοιοῦτο, as Plato's Master taught him long agoe. But in *Spiritual Beings*, and in *These only*, is True Harmony, Exact Convenience, Entire Identity, Perfect Union, to be found.

Such, even Such, is
That near Relation,
That

to the Reader.

That neere Kindred between the *Soule* and *Truth*; as will fully appear in This following Discourse of *Truth*; (which was never meant, nor now published, but as a *Prodromus* to a Future *Treatise* about *Prophetick Truth* revealed now in Scripture:) Of which I shall only adde this; Read it; if it displease, Read it again, and yet again; and then judge. It needs not my Apology; if so, I might truly say, When 'twas first VVrot, 'twas intended but a Letter to

The Preface

a private Friend, (not a Critick;) and since its first writing, and sending, 'twas never so much as perused, much lesse, refined, by its Noble Author.

One VVord more I must speak, and so have done. If any Ingenuous Reader shall Dissent (in any Particular of Consequence) and freely, yet ingenuously, manifest the Reasons of his Dissent: Nothing can bee more gratefull to This Noble Lord, who promiseth the Fairest Answer, for,
His

to the Reader.

His Aime is only *Search*
of *Truth*; which, His
Lordship well knows, is
oft best found, as *Sparks*
in the *Flint*, by much
Contusion.

Yet, if any shall
wrangle, not dispute:
rudely thrust, or strike
not like a Gentleman;
His Return will be,
only a *Rational Neglect*.

F. S

28 MR 59

R Ecensui tractatum hunc, qui
inscribitur, (The Nature of
Truth,) per illustrissimum piissi-
mumque Dominum. Robertum
D. Brooke editum: apprimè sanè
Doctum, profundisque conceptibus
insignitum: quapropter dignissi-
mam arbitror qui in summam uti-
litatem typis mandetur.

Novemb. 19.

1640.

Johannes Hansley,
R. P. Episc. Lond.
Capell. domest.



THE
NATURE
OF
TRUTH.

Discussed in a Letter
to a private
Friend.

S I R,

I Have according to
my poore talent, es-
sayed to finde out
the true sense of the Spirit
in these * two Chapters,
and

* Mat. 24.
Rev. 20.
Expound-
ed, in a-
nother
Treatise.

The Nature of Truth.

and in this Inquest, have improved the labours of the piously learned; from whom I have received little other favour than this, that they have not seduced me; they not having approached so neere to the truth, as to dazle it. I confesse, that Reverend, that bright man, Master *Brightman*, hath clothed his opinion, with such a Sirenian glory, that he had almost been to me an *ignis fatuus*. I had almost, in following the old, lost the young, lost the nest of Lapwings. But, with all respect to his Worth, (if I am not mightily mistaken) I have escaped that *Syris*; and yet dare I not with the Philosopher cry out *εὐρηκα*; for, **who is fit for these things?*

* 2 Cor. 2.
16.

Every

The Nature of Truth.

Every truth is *a mystery; what must that be then, which is purposely veiled by the Spirit? *Iesus Christ*, who is styled in Scripture, the **way, truth, life, light*, (and these things are apprehended by sense, and are common) is to **the Iewes a stumbling block, and to the Greekes foolishnesse.*

May we not then justly say of him that dares pry into the Arke, with hopes and thoughts cleerly to unfold the mysterious, the propheticall part of *Iesus Christ*, to unknit the Gordian knot; May wee not say of him, what GOD saith of *Iob*; *who is this that darkeneth wisdom with counsell?*

Alas, are we not all since *Adams* lapse buried under the

**Veritas in
fundo putei.
Democr.*

**Ioh. 14. 6.*

** 1 Cor. 1.
23.*

Iob 38. 1.

The Nature of Truth.

* 1 Cor. 8. 2

the shadow of death, and lost in the region of darkness? Who is there that knoweth truth? * *He that thinketh he knoweth any thing, knoweth nothing as he should.*

Morall truth, which (as some thinke) is yet more within our reach, than those sacred mysteries, is unknown to us, both in the universal nature, and in the particular actings of it; *Difficilia quæ pulchra.*

Indeed *Truth* is that golden apple, which though it hath (in some sense) been offered to the fairest; yet the most refined wits, the most high-raised fancies of the world, have courted her in vaine, these many ages: For whilst they have sought, with

The Nature of Truth.

with a Palsie hand, this glorious star, through the perspective of thicke reason, they have either mounted too high, and confounding the Creator with the creature, made her God; or descending too low, and deserting the universal nature, have cōfined their thoughts to some individuall Truth, and restrained her birth to severall parcels within the Chaos.

A double
error in
searching
of truth.

THE

28 MR 59



THE
NATURE
OF
TRUTH.
Its union and unity
with the SOULE.

CHAP. I.

*The Vnderstanding and the
Truth-understood, are one.*

TRUTH is indeed
of the seed Roy-
all, of Progeny
Divine: yet so, as
to be (for I may say of her,
what the Spirit saith of
P. B. 36. Faith)

•Rom 1c.8

Faith) * neere us, to be in us. And when she is pleased to descend into our valleys, and to converse with us, she erects her own pavilion, and doth fix it in whatsoever is lovely in us.

The *Understanding* is her throne, there she reigneth, and as she is there seated, as she shineth in that part of the soule; she appeareth to me under two notions, which are also her measure through the whole sphere of Being; as will be discovered more hereafter, when these lesser streames shall have emptied themselves by progresse into a larger river.

First, that very *Being*, which immediatly floweth from above, and is the rise

or

or the first and uniforme ground-work in this particular Being which we now treat of, and which under this notion wee call the *form or substance*.

Secondly, those workings which breathe from thence, as all actions and sayings, which are (in our phrase) the effects of a reasonable soule.

I shall first in few words treat of the first, and then very briefly conclude with a word or two upon the second part of Truth.

This first Truth is the *Understanding* in its Essence: for what is the *Understanding* other than a Ray of the Divine Nature, warming and enlivening the Creature, conforming it to

The Understanding or Truth there, under two notions.

An argument proving the nature of the Understanding to be Truth.

the likenesse of the Creator? And is not Truth the same? For the Beauty of Truths character is, that she is a shadow, a resemblance of the first, the best forme; that she is *light*, the species, the sparkling of primitive *light*; that she is *life*, the sublimation of *light*, * that she may reflect upon her selfe.

*Vita est in
se reflectio.
Sen. Epist.
Life a
higher de-
gree of
light.*

That she is *light*, none will deny; that *light* in reasonable creatures is the fountaine of *life*, is manifest. For the forme of a reasonable soule is *light*, and therefore when the soul informeth and giveth *life* to *Animal rationale*, it enableth the creature to work according to *light*, and upon Her accesses the organs
can

can entertaine *light*, as the eye then beholds the *light* of the Sun; upon Her retirements they are dark and uselesse. Thus whilst *life* is *light*, and *light* is Truth, and Truth is conformity to God; and the *understanding* as we yet discourse of it, is this *light* to the soule, the *Understanding* and Truth can be but one.

The eye
by the pre-
sence of
the soule
made able
to see
lig't.

CHAP. II.

The second Argument, proving that truth is the Nature of the Understanding.

U Know the learned choose rather to stile the understanding, a *faculty*; and so institute a soule recipient; a

Most call
the under-
standing a
faculty.

B 3 Being

Being (*scil.* Truth) received; and a faculty, which is the *understanding*, whereby the soule receiveth and acteth according to what it doth entertaine.

But with submission to their better judgement, I should crave leave to make one *Quære*.

Are there not to the constitution of every Being three notions requisite?

Three notions requisite to the constitution of every Being.

First, the Fountain communicating.

Secondly, the Channell entertaining.

Thirdly, the Waters imparted.

I confesse, we must not in Metaphysicall Beings expect Physicall subsistencies; yet ἀνάλογόν τι all learning doth allow of. But where shall

shall wee finde these in the *understanding*? whilest the intellect passeth under the notion of a *faculty*. Indeed wee may discern the last (*scil.*) those sweet beames of *light* which beat upon us continually.

The understanding as a faculty affordeth not these 3. notions.

The understanding is not the subject of truth.

But where is the second which entertaineth them? If it be the *understanding*, then the *light* which differēceth us from the vegetative and sensitive creatures, lieth in the *understanding*, and not in the soule; and the soule (which all men hold to be a spirituall Being) is but a *Theca* to the intellect, as the body is the Tabernacle of the soule. Or, if the soule hath *light* as well as the *understanding*, then are there two enlightened Beings in

Marti. l. 5.
epi. 53.

one reasonable creature :
*Non-belle quædam faciunt
duo, sufficit unus Huic operi.*
Two reasonable Beings in
one *Compositum*, is too un-
reasonable a thing.

Thirdly, Who is it that
communicateth this *light* ?
It is conveyed to the *un-
derstanding* either from the
soule, or some other way.

The un-
derstand-
ing recei-
veth not
truth from
the soule.

If from the soule, then
the soule doth not finde the
defect of the *understanding*.
For, if the soule can com-
municate *light*, then hath
it *light* already ; the same, or
more excellent ; then can it
worke, diffuse *light*, and en-
joy it selfe ; and so this fa-
culty, the *understanding*,
shall be in vaine.

If in any other way, it
must either be immediately
from

from God, or *mediante Crea-
tura.*

If from a creature, and not from the soule, it must be by some other facultie intervenient. For, if the soule (which by their consent is a more noble Agent than the *understanding*) cannot, according to their Doctrine, act without a faculty; how shall an inferior Being work, without some such like subservient help? And thus may you *excurrere in infinitum*, which, according to the Philosophers, may not be done; for, *Entia non sunt multiplicanda, nisi necessario.*

Not from
any crea-
ture

If the truth come from God, then why is it not immediately, intrinsically, infused into the
B 5 soule

Not from
God.

*Deus agit
à centro in
circumfe-
rentiam.*

In spiritu-
all giving
and recei-
ving there
must be a
metaphy-
sica. union

soule it selfe? But how-
ever the *understanding* bee
enriched with this treasure
of Truth, if it be imparted
to it, then is it, it selfe that
Truth, that *light* which I
contend for. For God doth
not communicate *light* (by
light (which I take in a Me-
taphoricall sense) I under-
stand some spirituall excel-
lency) and such *light* (I say)
God doth not offer but to
light. For, *quicquid recipi-
tur, recipitur ad modum reci-
pientis*. Cleopatra her dissol-
ved union would have been
to Esops cocke of lesse
value than a barley corne.
And if the *understanding*
have not light, it cannot
take it, unlesse by being tur-
ned into the nature of it.
For what giving and recei-
ving

ving can here be, besides that which maketh both to become one and the selfe same? *Light came into the world, but it was refused by darknesse. Ignoti nulla cupido.*

John 1.5.

Thus the *understanding* and *light* are different in names, may be different in degrees, but not in nature. For what that Reverend man ⁱ Doctor *Twist* saith most acutely of a spirituall gift, I may say of spirituall *light*. The soule cannot refuse a spirituall gift (I now speak in his phrase.) The soule and any spirituall Being doe not, as corporeall things, greet each other by the help of the *Loco-motive* faculty; but when Grace is given by *God* to the soul, there

i Doct. of Syn. Dort. p.25.lin.12 Neither a quality permanent, nor an act immanent; unless they be made inherent in the soul, and the latter also produced by it, can be said to be given to the soul.

To receive
light is to
be light.


there is, as it were (*da veni-
am voci*) an hypostaticall
union betwixt the gift and
the soule; and the soule
cannot reject it, because
they are no more Two but
one. So to be in the capa-
city or act of receiving
light, is to be light.

Lastly, how passeth this
light from the *understand-
ing* to the soule? Will not
here be left as vast a gulfe,
as they make betweene the
understanding and the *will*,
which make them divers;
whence grow those inex-
tricable disputes, How the
the *will* is made to *under-
stand*, what the *understand-
ing* judgeth fit to bee wil-
led?

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

A prosecution of the second Argument, wherein these three notions are applied to the understanding, being made one with the truth.

 LI these rubs are easily taken out of the way, if you make that which you call the *understanding, truth*. For then have you,

First, the Father of mercies, dispensing *light and truth*.

Secondly, *light and truth* dispensed.

Thirdly, the *totum existens*, consisting of matter and forme, of materiall and immateriall Beings (as wee distin-

If you make the understanding light, you have the three notions which make up every Being.

distinguish them) called a *reasonable creature* thus informed or constituted, which we name the *recipient of this light and truth*.

Do not tell me, that I thus make the *recipient* and *thing received* all one; that is not strange in emanation divine. In Scripture you have a parallel of this.¹ The fourth vial is poured out upon the Sun (*scil.*) the Scriptures, and the Scriptures are the vial it selfe; the Scripture is emptied upon it selfe, it is agent and patient, receiver and received. I know learned *Mede* to prevent this, which to him is a difficulty, imagineth the Emperour to be the Sun; but in two words that is thus disproved.

First,

1 The 4.
viall men-
tioned
Rev. i 6. 8.
is the thing
emptying
and empti-
ed upon
itselfe.

First, the Emperour is no where called the Sun in this book; when he receiveth a metaphoricall typicall title, he is called the Dragon.

Secondly the Scriptures are in the *Revelation* divers times set forth to us by the Sun. So that if you refuse the sense which I fix upon, then you doe not onely forsake, but oppose the Scripture-pharse.

But were not this truth mounted in a celestiaall chariot, *Reason* it selfe would evince it. For, consider any individual Being you please, vegetative or ratiōall, or what you will, who is it that entertaineth this Being, but the Being it selfe which is entertained? Who is it that

Nay in all things Agent and Patient must bee one to him that considers. No Being but it is the thing receiving & received

The vanity of that question, Whether the soule be *continens* or *contentum*, discovered

that receiveth from the womb of Eternity that reasonable creature, but the creature received?

The ignorance of this Point, hath raised that empty Question, Whether the Soule or the Body be *contentum*? For if every Being be its own *contentum*, this Question will seeme to be no more a difficulty. And if there happen any neare union betwixt two Beings, as the Body and the Soule, the first is not *continens*, the other *contentum*; but as husband and wife, each bringeth his part towards the making up of the *compositum*.

Thus without any violation of Reasons right, I seeme justly to conclude, that

that the *totum existens*, consisting of matter and forme, the *reasonable creature*, is the *Recipient* of this truth.

CHAP. IIII.

This Argument further cleared by more objections propounded and answered.

BUT still it is demanded, why may not the *understanding* supply the third place? why may it not be this *Recipient*?

To whom I give this answer; That if they make the *understanding* but a quality, and depending upon some other Being, it cannot, as I have proved in this Discourse,

The Vnderstanding cannot be the recipient.

course, be the *recipient*: but if they look upon it as this *light*, this *truth* it selfe, then the dispute is reconciled.

Some call
the Intel-
lect *virtus*
quâ.

Some conceive, all these difficulties are cured, if you make the *understanding* only *virtus quâ*, concluding with the Philosopher, that *ibi subsistendum est*, without inquiry after a further progresse. I could *Iurare in verbamagistri*, I could acquiesce here, but that I desire to be convinced by reason and not by termes. I shall therefore humbly ask this question.

The Intel-
lect can-
not be *vir-*
tus quâ.

What difference is there betwixt *virtus quâ* and a faculty? as in a knife, the cutting ariseth from the sharpnesse, and this sharpnesse is *virtus quâ*, or the faculty whereby the knife doth cut.

If

If it be but a faculty, then I repaire to my former answere : but if something else than a faculty, it must either be a nominall Being, or reall existence.

If the first, it beareth no weight.

If the second, then I say, it must entertaine species (for all spirituall glories doe operate by the communication of their divine species) and then will you be cast upon the former rock.

Yet still they say, the *understanding*, being a spirituall Being, receiveth light in some way which we know not; and so they proceede to obscure distinctions and voluminous discourses, concerning *intellectus agens* & *intel-*

As the Arabians,
Zabarell,
&c.

The last
objection
answered.

* A&. 17.
vers. 23.

intellectus patiens or *passibilis*. But the wiser sort of them, perceiving the thinnesse, aerialnesse and crazinesse of this Spiders web, have with greater probability made *God* to be *intellectus agens*, by his influence upon the understanding.

Respon. Is not this the Athenian Altar, which groaned under that Superscription, * *To the unknowne God?* I would I could discover with *S. Paul* to them this light, this truth, which they know not, that they might love it and imbrace it. But secondly, I dispute not against things I know not: They know not this. I know that I may better maintaine the other, that the Understanding is not the Recipient
of

of this light, than they averre that *it is*, in a way whereof they never hope to finde any footsteps.

CHAP. V.

The Soule and truth in the Soule are one.

I May yet be pressed with this objection: All these difficulties may be urged against the *Soule*, which have been produced against the *Vnderstanding*.

Resp. Are not these like the untrue Mother, who will kill the childe, because she cannot call it her own? If these inconveniences be justly urged against the *Soul*,
it

The Sou^l,
Vnder-
standing,
Truth, all
but one.

it will not deliver the *Vnderstanding*. But I will deale ingenuously, and confesse that if you take the Soule under any other notion than Truth; If you deeme it, first to be a Being, and then to be light, as God made *Adam* first (I meane the body) and then breathed life into him; if, I say, there be first a Being, and then an infusion of light, you will be pressed with the former arguments. But if you make the *Understāding*, the Soul, Light, Truth, one, then are you quite delivered out of all these straights, and then is it true which I averre, that, that degree of light, which we enjoy in the inward man, is the *specificall difference*, which distinguisheth

sheth between us and brutes, deservedly called *reason*, that ample Sphere of Truth, which is the *All* in us, and besides which we are wholly nothing.

Are not wee said to be made after the image of God? and if in any thing we are honoured with this inscription, it is in the most noble part? Now God is *unus, purus, simplex actus*. For (with submission to his better learning and judgement) I cannot subscribe to Dr Ames his manner of expression, who saith, first there is God, and then his attributes are in him, * *tanquam in esse secundo*. If then we

An Argument proving the Soule and Truth to be one.

God and his attributes are not two.

* *Deo insunt quasi in esse secundo, ab*

essentiâ & inter se distinguuntur non solum ratione ratiante, sed etiam ratiatâ, ita ut fundamentum distinctionis sit in ipso Deo. Theo. lib. 1. cap. 4. Sect. 27. 28.

doe

do beare his impresse, *quam non passibus equis*, it must be in that which is (as farre as we can judge) *DEI formalis ratio*, which is to be *purus, simplex actus*.

* 1 Ioh. 3.
vers. 2.

In this our shadowy resemblance of the Deity, I shall not challenge perfection; for though the Scripture say, * *we shall hereafter be perfect as he is perfect*, and doth here style us, *partakers of divine nature*; yet all this is to be understood according to our little modell. Unity is that wherein wee carry some touches, some lineaments of his Majesty. Unity is Gods Essence. Unity is all what we are. For division being the birth of nothing, can be nothing. And thus may we raise from
cur

our Microcosme, a passable Hieroglyphick of the Trinity.

Truth as it is in the breast of Eternity intended to the Sonnes of men, resembles *Patrem intelligentem* ; as it descends from above, *Filium intellectum* ; as it informeth the Soule, enjoyeth and reflecteth upon it selfe, *Spiritum dilectum*. We must not then expect, First, a Being of the Soule : Secondly, a faculty whereby it worketh. *God* and his attributes, are but one; mercy and justice kisse each other in him; he and they are *ens necessarium*; And so the Soule and the Faculty is one, that divine light and truth.

Truth as it hath been described, resembleth the Trinity.

CHAP. VI.

*All things are this one light
or truth, shining from God.*

BUt if the Intellect,
the Soul, Light and
Truth are (from the
reasons alledged) *all* but
one, this argument will
presse all things that are;
then will all Being fall un-
der the same Predicament.

This is that which I ay-
med at; and why not? See-
ing that, First, all Being is
derived from the same foun-
taine, *scil.* from him who is
uniforme, in all like him-
selfe.

Secondly, All Being is
the same in nature, (*scil.*)
a beame of that excellent
light,

light, and therefore in Metaphysicks * *Truth* and *Being* are one.

Thirdly, All *Being* is entertained in the same manner by every individuall existence, which is the subject receiving this light from above : and all reall true reception is alone by similitude and union of nature.

Yet I shall not agree to confound the names of particular *Beings*, though I doe conjoyne their natures. For, all *Being* may be compared to *light* ; in such a body it is styled the *Sunne* ; in another it is called the *Moone* ; in the third it beareth the name of a *Starre*, and under various shapes, the names of various *Stars*,

* *Vnum, verum, bonum, Ens, terminiconvertibiles.*

All being is this truth.

as *Syrus, Canopus, &c.* but all is *light*, and it is but *light*. The body of waters is by us called *Seas*; when they beate upon such a coast, it beareth one name; when it coasteth upon another soyle, it receiveth a severall denomination. All Being is this *light*, this *truth*; but contained within those *Circles*, it appeareth to us under this name; and againe, it hath another style when it beateth upon a various object.

All Being is but *light*, communicating it selfe to us through severall cran- nies, some greater, some lesse, whilst all is *light*.

* *Plato* most excellently, most acutely, most truly hath made all Being of *Terminus* and *Infinitem*. : The first

*Vide Pla-
tonem in
Phile.in Ti-
maeo. Ter-
minus, In-
finitum,
prima ele-
menta, un-
de quin-
que gene-
ra reru n.

first Being appearing to us in severall bounds and measures amidst the vast infinity of darknesse or nothing.

The Platonick Philosophers do not erre, who reduce all Beings to number, making *one* all and the chief, and the other more or lesse glorious, as they have two, three, or foure, more or lesse numbers or degrees.

*Ficin. com.
in Tim. co.
Vide Platonem ubique.
Omnes numeri in unitate.*

Whence they had this Maxime, I know not ; this I know, Satan, that old Serpent, is very learned, and can sometimes (as he doth, when hee calls Jesus the Christ and sonne of God) can, I say, sometimes, tell true, that so hee may even by truth entaile to himselfe a certaine interest in such Disciples as refuse any

r *Virg. in*
capit. 1.
 Quia nu-
 merus im-
 par, nume-
 rus indivi-
 sibilis. Ficin.
 comment.
 in Plat.
 Timæ.

other allurements than that
 of golden truth: and it is
 to be feared, that they have
 had too great and free con-
 verse with him. For even
 this sweet point of learning
 have they shamefully abu-
 sed to charmes and spells, as
 that of the Poet, *Numero*
Deus impare gaudet. Two
 was curst, because it first
 departed from unity; Three
 whereby unity againe re-
 turned into it selfe, became
 sacred.

But it may be (*& spero*
meliora) that they received
 it from the Egyptians, and
 the Egyptians from the He-
 brews.

Now, if this be true,
 (which I submit to the
 judgement of the wise) then
 all Being is but one, and all
 things

things are more or lesse excellent, as they partake more or lesse of this first Being.

This doctrine of Platonists will not be so unsavory, if we pay unto *unity* its due tribute. I confesse, according to true Philosophy, Time is but *mensura motus vel ordinis*, which both are the same; Number, *calculus temporis*; One is *principium tantum numeri*, and so it is hardly a part of that which is but the handmaid of circumstance.

CHAP. VII.

How unity is all in all things.

BUt I should desire that we might consider whether it doth not carry something in

The excellency of unity.

it, in nature more glorious, something that may seem to informe a Being. If I cannot tell what it is, you will excuse me, knowing how hard a thing it is to finde out the Forme of any Being, and how much more hard to discover the Being of a Forme.

But from this reason I doe seeme to collect some glimmering light of what I now propound.

All Being seemeth to breath and catch after *unity*. *Gravia* doe not more naturally incline downwards, than all Being doth naturally seeke for *unity*.

Of Beings there are but two sorts.

Uncreated.

Created.

Un-

Uncreated, is God only.

Created, is

Spirituell.

Morall.

Physicall.

Mathematicall.

In all these you will find
Unity as it were the Forme
of their Being.

My thoughts, my ignorance,
my no thoughts of
the first, incomprehensible,
inaccessible Majesty, I desire
to propound with fear,
trembling and reverence.

If *Iohn* in the midst of
revelation, being overcome
with nothing but the glitterings
and sparklings of the
creature, did mistake, and
worshipped one of his fellow-
servants; if the Jewes
refused to trample upon any
contemptible scroul, fearing

Rev. 22. 9.

left, in them, the namelesse name of God might be included: surely wee in the midst of darknesse, having to doe, not with the name, but with the nature of Eternity, ought to cloathe our spirits with much modestie.

I shall therefore humbly propound this to consideration, Whether *unity* be not *all in God*.

I confesse there are three persons in one Godhead (and that is the mysterie) and yet but one God. And more there could not have beene; for this God is infinite, eternall, &c. and onely one can be so; there cannot bee two Infinites, two Eternities.

And againe, this *one* cannot

not be otherwise, for if hee could have been something else, hee had not beene infinite.

If then *unity* bee such a necessary (give us leave to speake as wee can) accident, as, without which God could not have been what hee is: may it not bee said that *unity* is co-essentiall to him, seeing that the Deity admits of no accidents? And if of his Essence, then *unity* is in him all, for the Essence of God is all in God, and God in his Essence is but one *Divinity*.

Ob. But so, infinity, power, &c. all attributes are in God his Essence, as well as *unity*?

Ans. All other attributes

*Unity all
in God.*

butes are at length resolved into this of unity. Of this, can be given no accompt, but only negative. All explications flow from this, returne to this, that God is one.

*Fic. comment. in
Plat. Sym-
pos.*

What is it to be infinite? *Ficinus* answers, to have nothing of privation mixt, to be *plenus sui*; which is to be *One*.

The power of God is the unity of all Being in *one point*. What is this, *I am that I am*; but this, *I am one*? The same we may say of all other the names of God.

Unity in
spirituall
Beings.

When we survey the nature of spirituall Beings, we shall find them in Scripture stiled *one*. For God reduceth all the commandments

dements to *love*. And the Saints, who are, *quatenus* Saints, spirituall Beings, (for their Saintship is a spirituall excellency) are stiled, *Rom. 12.5. one body*; and, *Gal. 3. 16. they are all one in Iesus Christ*.

Christ and his Church are but one body. Now, this *union* carrieth certainly something with it more essentiall than a figure.

When the three persons are united in one deity, the *union* is more close than a figurative *union*. The conjunction of the humane nature, and the second person in the Trinity, is a very entire conjunction; and so is that of the Saints with Christ. There is the union of the whole humane nature

ture with one person. Here is the union of divers persons to the whole divine nature. And we may easily allow a neare union to these Metaphysicall Beings : seeing even in naturall things, there is as it were an unity, even of two Physicall existences. For G O D saith, *You two shall be one flesh*; he saith not one, but one flesh. But these are *enigmata*, while we see through glasses of flesh.

Gen. 2. 24.

1 Cor. 13.
12.

Morall.

Seeing Morall Beings are, by generall consent, of fraternall alliance to spirituall, both in nature and operation; I shall not say any thing of them, but onely what is said by all, that *virtutes sunt concatenate*.

I shall therefore minde
you

you but of this, how in Physicall Beings, every thing doth delight in unity. And this is very plaine in the stillicids of water, which, if there be water enough to follow, will draw themselves into a small thred, because they will not sever: and when they must disunite, then they cast themselves into round drops, as the figure most resembling unity.

Vnitie in
Physicall
Beings.

Whence is that Sympathy in nature betweene the Earth and the Adamant, but from hence, that they being of one nature, desire to improve their unity by mutuall imbraces?

When have the Sun-beams their vigor and efficacy, beating upon the burning glasse,
but

but when the glasse hath gathered them all into one ?

Where is the power of our five senses, which are in their nature so honourable, that *nihil cadit in intellectum, quod non prius cadit in sensum* ? Where is their vertue, but in *communis sensus* ? Nay (if I durst be so bold) but this I may not now dispute: I conceive all the senses are but one, and that is * *Tactus*. For their Energie is nothing till the ray from the object to the organ, and from the organ to the object touch in one.

It is most happily expressed by Sir *Iohn Suckling* ;

*[Who having drawn the breasts
of wit and fancie drie,*

May

* I am informed that my Lord *Castle-Island* in his book *d: Veritate*, affirmeth that there is but one sense: but I am not so happy as to have that booke by me, nor doe I remember it since my last reading it, so that I dare not say it confidently.

*May justly now write Man,
must not a Suckling die.]*

When he saith,
*The circumambient aire doth
make us all
To be but one bare Indi-
duall.*

What are the Mathema-
ticall sciences, but *Vnity*
turning it selfe into severall
formes of *Numbers* and *Fi-
gures*, yet still remaining
entire ? Harmony, pro-
portion, proportionality,
which are the subject, the
soule of all Knowledge
here, are so many severall
names of the same unity.
Beauty is but one act of
grace and sweetnesse, which
seemes to us composed of
various parcels. *Musick is
one

Sir Iohn
Suckling in
his Play,
Act 2,
Scene 1.

*Ficin.Com-
ment. in
Sympof.
Plat.
*Ficin.Com-
ment. in
Tim.Plat.*

one forme resulting from many different sounds. This is that mystery, which unknowne, hath confounded the Schools in that Question, whether quantity be *divisibilis in semper divisibile*. All things are certainly at last reduced to an *Vnity*; yea, all things appeare to us cloathed with one forme; yet are we never able to search out the perfection of this, when we most accurately pursue it. The glory and majesty thereof is such, that it rendreth our minds incapable of any more than a grosse view, like that of the Sunne in his splendour.

* Plato in
symp. in
Orat. Eri-
xym.

Democritus his definition of Being, is very considerable, * *Est aliquid differens à se,*

à se, quod sibi convenit: and indeed, all Being is but one, taking various shapes, sometimes discovering it selfe under one, sometimes under another, whereas it is but one Being: and this is light, truth, that (as I said before) beame of divine glory, which is the spring of all Beings.

To close this discourse, give me leave thus to set forth that Majesty, whereby Unity wrappeth up all things within it selfe. There can be no recedence from Unity, unlesse by addition of a new, distinct, Unity. But where will you finde This? A simple Unity must be entirely one with the First; if you adde any thing to Unity, whereby it may differ,
it

Nominall
division of
Being re-
quisite for
our con-
verse.

it remaines no more One,
but becomes a Duality.


Yet doe I in no wise re-
ject that division of Being
left us by our Masters,
when they teach us, that
there is first a Being which
is knowne to Be, but it selfe
in its Being is insensible.

Secondly, another that
is sensible, but knoweth not
its owne excellency.

Thirdly, that which know-
ing its owne excellency,
can reflect upon it selfe.
For, I say, this which is cal-
led vegetative, sensitive, and
rationall, is all of one na-
ture.

CHAP. VIII.

The nature of Habits.

Nd whilst I affirme
that the soule is
nothing but this
Truth, I doe not refuse the
doctrine of *Habits*, either
Infused or *Acquisite*.

Habits in-
fused, ac-
quisite.

For when the soule by
vertue of its Being, is cleare
in such a truth, it is said to be
an infused habit. When by
frequent action, such a truth
is connaturall to the soule,
it may be stiled an habit
acquisite: though indeed all
is but light more or lesse
glorious, discovering it
selfe frequently or rarely,
and by divine appointment,
at

at such a conjunction of time, and not any other, not that the soule is informed by its owne action; for what hath the streame which it derives not from the source? What can those workings adde to that, from which they receive themselves?

And therefore I wholly subscribe to the Platonists, who make all *scientia* nothing but *reminiscentia*; for when it appeareth not, it is not; the soule being but an activity. it must be no more than it acteth: and though we seeme by frequent actings to helpe the soule, and so to create in it acquisite habits, yet these are but a *Phænomenon*. This is but the way
which

which God discloseth to our eye, whereas all the actings are onely new discoveries.

Our Philosophers affirme thus boldly of the unreasonable creature, attributing it all to the instinct, or a new influence.

Why may not, why must not we conclude the same of man, seeing it is a received truth, that *acti agimus*, and we are in our strength in regard of God no better than the most abject creature?

But if *all* be one; (Soule, Understanding, Habits, all the same:) then neither doe faith and reason differ.

Surely they differ onely in degrees, not in nature.

That Reverend holy man,
that

The difference between naturall and supernaturall habits.

that dexterous *cominus-pugnator*, seemeth to averre the same or more in historicall and saving faith*.

* Mr Baill.
Divers sorts

of Faith. page 3. Faith signifying beleefe, is used to note, first an ordinary knowledge and bare assent to the historicall truth of the Speaker, though sometimes holpen by experiments, and other inducements and probabilities of the things: and this is called Faith Historicall, that is, a naked, imperfect, dead assent, without trust or confidence in the mercies of God, or adherence to the commandments. Howbeit we must not imagine, that Faith is reputed unsound or not salvificall, because Historicall (rather it is oftentimes insufficient to save, because it is not so fully Historicall as might be) but the name of Historicall Faith arose hence, that some are said to beleefe, who did never embrace Christ as their only Saviour with all their hearts, nor confidently rely upon the promises of mercy; otherwise, justifying Faith doth more certainly beleefe the truth of the history of the Gospel, and so is more historicall than the Faith called Historicall.

* These
meanes
teach us
further

Mr Huit in his Anatomy
of Conscience, cleerely af-
firmeth it. *

to make much of the least beginnings of grace, even those which Divines commonly call repressing, since they prepare the heart to conversion, and in some
sense

sense be called the inchoation thereof: seeing temporary and living faith differ not in forme, but degrees of perfection; there is a faith in the true convert, of no better perfection than that in the temporary, though he stay not there, as the other (being an unwise son) doth. *Huit Anat. Conscience pag. 214.*

The first degree is Reason.

A second, Historicall.

A third, Temporary.

A fourth, Saving faith.

A fifth, Plerophorie.

A sixth, **Beatifica visio*,

that *light whereby we shall see as we are seene*; these are of the same nature with that light which a reprobate is partaker of.

* 1 Ioh. 3.
vers. 2.

And if any man question the truth of this, let him but consider, that the Donor is the same, our good God.

The Efficient, Instrumentall, and Formall cause, is Jesus Christ.

D

The

The subject recipient, the
totum existens.

And the Gift it selfe is
light or truth, a spirituall
Being.

How can it choose then,
but to be one and the same,
seeing (as I said before) such
a Recipient cannot enter-
tain any other guest?

Neither doe I at all abett
that unhappy opinion of
falling away from Grace.

There is in the opinion *aliquid nefasti*, and therefore
I study to shun it. The pro-
pugnators of it are unhap-
py; for they have not onely
made a rent amongst us, but
strengthened a common ad-
versary.

The oppugnators also are
unhappy; for they have so
managed the cause, that their

Adver-

The con-
troverſie
about fal-
ling from
Grace.

Adversaries lie almost under invincible darknesse : for the oppugners fearing to speake plaine, have called *Spontaneitatem, liberam voluntatem*, and it is impossible to distinguish betweene *Libera voluntas Contra-Remonstrantium, & liberum arbitrium Remonstrantium*.

And whilst the *Remonstrants* finde no difference in this main Tenet, they weigh all the rest in the same scale, and judge accordingly. For an argument often alledged by many learned men, if it confuteth not, it doth confirme an error ; and thus are they out of the reach of truth.

That learned, that pious man, the first fruit of our Church her resurrection, sa-

mous Calvin, styled it *Spon-
taneitatem*, and not *liberam
voluntatem* : For, *Deus* and
libera voluntas are incompat-
tible, not to be cemented by
that distinction without dif-
ference, *Libera à necessita-
te, sed non ab infallibilitate*.
And therefore mighty *Rut-
terfort affirmeth, that *posse
Dei decreto absoluto* (and all
things are under such a de-
cree) *insulse queritur an po-
tentia libera sub eo decreto sit
indifferens*.

* Deo enim,
sive scienti-
am ejus spe-
clemus,
quippe om-
nia scit;
sive volun-
tatem, quæ
ad nihil cre-
atum vel

creabile est suspensa, sed ab æterno determinata, nulla est
potentis disjunctiva : considerari quidem potest potentia
creata, non considerato divino decreto, & in signo ratio-
nis decretum Dei antecedente. Sed in tali Chimæricæ
consideratione, adversarij nobis litem vitiosâ nuce hæc
emptitandam frustra serunt. Ac verò actû, non est ulla po-
tentia creata, nisi quæ sub est æterno DEI decreto, nisi quæ
a Deo divine providentiæ renuntiare velit, &c. Rutter-
Exerc. Apolog. Exerc. I. c. I. Sect. 8.

But

But here I am not to, I cannot, dispute this question. Onely I say thus much, it is so unhappy an opinion, that I hope I shall not at all abett it.

For though Reason and Faith be one in nature: yet is not *reason* that degree of *light*, of which the Spirit hath said, *My seed is in you, and you cannot sinne.* And therefore men cannot lose that which they never had. And this will be a little more cleere, by the answer to the next objection, which is this.

If Faith and Reason, if knowledge and grace be all but one light, how cometh it to passe, that some who have lesse light, have more faith? and those again,

D 3

who

1 Ioh. 3. 9.
Difference
berwixt
Knowledg
and Faith.

Object.

who are for knowledge, as Angels of light, are not partakers of that which is called *Saving faith*?

This difficulty is rather mazy, than strong; I shall therefore hope to bring the Ariadnean thread.

And at first aboard, I deny the proposition. I conceive it a mistake. For I doe verily beleeve, that the weakest Saint knoweth more of God, than the most intelligent of those Spirits, who though once in heaven, are now in intolerable flames.

All men confesse thus much, that even the meanest Christian, hath more experimental knowledge of GOD, than *Beelzebub* the Prince of the aire. And doth not this convince them of what

what I affirme ? For what (to speake in their language) is experiment, but the daughter of light, gathered by frequent observation ? If experiment be but light, and their experience is more than that of the greatest wits ; then (if I mistake not) by necessary consequence, their light is more and greater.

But I suppose, the error may be cleared by this Simile.

The one is as the man who hath studied the Theory, the other the Practicke of any art or science.

The first may know more *in appearance* ; but the other *indeed* knoweth more.

You shall finde two unequally learned, The first is

D 4

a

Experi-
ence, col-
lection of
particular
lights.

Knowledg,
{ recall.
{ appa-
rent.

a Gnosticke, a *helluo literarum*; the other hath not read so much, but hath concocted, mastered and subdued all before him. Which now is said to know more?

Psal. 14. 1.

The foole hath said (not, as some expound it, wished) *in his heart, there is no GOD.* It is true, now and then he hath some glimmering light of a Deity, but anon againe all is shaken, and he saith, *there is no God.*

Psal. 12. 4.

Doth not the people of Israel say, *Wee are our owne Lords, who shall controule us?* We have made a covenant with death and hell, and none shall reach us. Can these men, these Beings be said to know God?

If you object the devils age and experience, it cannot

not help ; it is but , as you call it , a collection of his owne lights , and all the starres shining together make not day.

I should onely aske this one question, *Can the diuels beleewe or know God to be all mercy ?* It is impossible, because they cannot beleewe him so to themselves.

Ob. But some say, Neither doe the best men beleewe him so to the wicked.

Resp. Yes, we doe , wee know him in his nature to be mercifull to them.

Besides, mercy and justice are all but one thing in God ; and this those miserable Creatures cannot consent to, that their ruine is the effect of supreme perfection, infinite sweetnesse.

God, mercy and sweetnesse to the diuels.

To the confirmation of this, I shall but presse this one consideration.

As wee know, wee love.

Διφέρει ὁ
σπουδαῖος
τῷ τᾷ λε-
θές ἐν πα-
σιν ὁρᾷ
καιῶν καὶ
μέτρον ὦν.
Arist. Eth.
lib 3. c. 6.
vide & c. 7.
ci. ca fi-
nem.

If they did *know* more than the Saints, they must needs *love* more; and in this I shall have all those my abettors, who hold that the *will* doth necessarily follow the *understanding*; which whilst *Aristotle* denieth in broad and open disputes, he doth in tacite termes closely yeeld to.

I doe apprehend it an undeniable truth, that what Good soever I know to be good, I must love. And therefore if wicked men did know more of God, they must know him needs under the notion of good: and so Seeing goodnesse in his nature, they must love him

him more. I might adde, what good we know, we are: our act of understanding being an act of *union*, which (as before) being Metaphysicall in the soule, must be entire.

What we know, we are.

CHAP. IX.

The difference betwixt Knowledge and affection, discussed.

IT may be that what hath beene disputed, will be granted: but there is yet an objection which requireth solution.

Ob. If all Being differeth onely in degrees, not nature; if knowledge, affection,

fection, light, activity, bee all one; Whence is it that even amongst Christian men, holy, spirituall men, men of largest affections, (and the affections are the *activity*, the maine of the Soule) I say men of the largest affections are esteemed to know least of God? And others, whose affections are as it were benumbed, and all activity is placed in their braine, understand more of the divine nature?

Doth it not appeare from hence, say they, that all Being is not one, differing onely in degrees: but that there are even different natures, amongst which one may excell, whilst the other is deprest?

Sol. I could tell these men

men, who start the objection, that they deeme the *light* in the head, more than the *love* in the heart : and then I shall say, that with them the head is the higher degree, the heart the lower degree of light, and so all is but a different light; from whence, affection, being judgement in its infancy, ceaseth, when Knowledge groweth mature : as the heate and blaze of fire, is but its labouring towards purity and perfection, which therefore are no more when the cleare flame reacheth its Element. But other men think otherwise, and they doe pitch *all in the affections*, and the meaner light in the understanding; and so turning the table, still one shall be

Affection
handmaid
to Know-
ledge ac-
cording to
some.

Knowledg
a step to
Affection,
according
to others.
Knowledg
& affecti-
on names
of diffe-
rent de-
grees in
the ſame
nature.

Affection
perfection
of Know-
ledge.

be a parcell of, ora ſtep to
the other, and each carry a-
long *both* in equall meaſure
according to reality : how
much true affection, ſo
much knowledge, & *vice*
verſa : as I ſhall ſhew in o-
ther two answers, on which
I fixe the ſtrength of my
thoughts in this point. And
therefore

Secondly, I affirme con-
fidently, and, I hope, truly,
that he, who ſoars upon the
wings of *Affection*, and lay-
eth himſelfe in the arms of
Jesus Chriſt, though hee
amuse not his head with
the myſticall nature of the
Trinity, with the proceſſi-
on of the Spirit, with the
incarnation of Jesus Chriſt,
attempting to make that
holy oyle ; Touching the
Ark,

Arke, this glory which is too high for him ; loosing himselfe, while he laboreth to see how *humane* nature can be raised so high; *di-vine* condescend so low, as to bring forth the Hypostaticall Union: I say, such a one knoweth more of God, than the other.

It is often scene, a working head is like an over-hot liver, burneth up the heart, and so ruineth both: Whereas sweet humble affections, are the onely way to keepe the poore creature in a constancy of spirituall health. And in this care the Apostle to *Titus* forbids *foolish questions, endlesse genealogies, contentions, and brawlings about the Law.*

This *Law* is the rule of
life

Know-
ledge of-
ten no
Know-
ledge, but
a vaine
swelling.

Tit. 3. 6.

Knowledge
without
power, e-
ven in the
law for-
bidden.

Ceremo-
niall law
included
in the Mo-
rall.

Mar. 5. 28.

Mar. 7. 29.

life; and if we know not the *Law*, we cannot keepe the *Law*, and so we must perish; and yet we finde the search of this forbidden.

Object. Some will say, here is meant the Ceremoniall Law.

Answer. I will allow it; but is not the Ceremoniall included under the second precept? The people upon Christ his Sermon, wherein he taught, that *He that looketh on a woman to lust after her, hath committed adultery with her in his heart* (and so he gave the Law its full latitude) say, *He speaketh as one that hath authority, and not as the Scribes and Pharises*: conceiving it their duty and happinesse to know the Law

Law in its utmost limits ; and yet we are restrained from any brain-sick, heady, nice inquiry, even into the Law, *scil.* not to busie our heads with the knowing part, in over-great proportion, but labour to bring our knowledge to practise.

If then all such knowledge (I meane all knowledge of this nature) bee forbidden, it is because it is not good; it is not knowledge, but a vaine tumour in stead of reall greatnesse or growth: and that other of the affection, hath certainly more of God in it, and so more of truth.

The Apostle is so great an enemy to this kinde of know-

I Cor. II.
16.

knowledge, that having disputed such a point indifdaine of gain-sayers, he concludeth, *If any man lust to be contentious, we have no such custome, nor the Churches of God.*

Cant. 2. 1.

—*Demonstrat qualibet herba Deum.* He who refreshed with the sweet odours, pleased with the various comely shapes of a flower, can say, this is sweet, this is lovely, lovely indeed; Yet *Jesus Christ is a bed of spices, as the Lilly of the field, the Rose of Sharon, sweeter, much sweeter, ten thousand times more lovely.* This man knoweth God, this man loveth God, this man knoweth him indeed; and this knowledge, as it is the most pleasant here, so it will certainly

tainly prove the most profitable hereafter, and alwayes declare it selfe most reall.

Doth not the Apostle, doth not he most truly, most pathetically cry out; *Tbough I had the gift of prophecie, and knew all secrets, all knowledge, yea, if I had all faith, so that I could remove mountaines, I were nothing; I were as sounding brasse and a tinckling Cymbal, if I have not charity.* When all these excellencies meet in a Christian, as happily they may, yet it is charity that maketh him what he is, and the other *Beings* are but as *Phalerae*, as trappings which give a handsome set-off, but not a Being to a Christian.

Love is lovely in Gods eye,

2 Cor. 13. 2.

God, from
whom all
light com-
meth, is
fill'd Love
1 Ioh 4 16.

Women
in greatest
number
truly gra-
cious, be-
cause most
affectio-
nate.

eye, he is stiled the God of Love, the *God Love*. And in another place, the Scripture affirmeth that in this we have fulfilled the will of God, if we *love* one another; for by this we are made one with God, and so dwell in true light.

The two Tables are reduced to *Love* of God and our neighbour. So that sweet affections doe make the most sweet harmony in Gods eares. Of the Chorus of Saints, the greatest number will bee found amongst the feminine sexe, because these are most naturally capable of affection, and so most apt to make knowledge reall. It is true, I confesse, these affections misguided, led them first into

into transgression; but these same affections after, carried them first to the grave, then to the sight of a Saviour, gave them the enwombing of Christ, who (in some sense) might have entertained our nature in another way (if he had so pleased;) and these affections will one day raise many of them into the sweet embraces of everlasting joy.

Amongst the Church-Officers, the Pastor and the Doctor, according to *Timothie*, are more eminent than the rest, because *they labour in the word and doctrine*. Of these two, the Doctor is alwayes to have his sword alwayes girt about his thigh, he must enter into the lists with every uncircumcised

1 Tim. 5. 17

The Pastor preferred before the Teacher, because the truth of truth in the heart lieth in the affection.

circumcised *Goliath*. Hee must stand continuall sentinell, that no heresies be forced upon the Church. He must beat his braines in dissolving *difficilia*, and clearing *obscura*. He must sometimes faint away in watery cold fits, by picking up, and throwing out witleffe, saplesse sophismes, which though they cannot hurt the strong, may seduce the weake. In the meane time, the Pastor leadeth the flock into the sweet and pleasant meadowes, feeding them by the little brooks of seemingly shallow affections; and yet this man shall not onely receive equal honour with the Doctor, but be preferred before him; as appeareth clearly in *Eph. 4. 11.*

1 Cor.

1 Cor. 12. 26. As it was with the Israelites, so it is here ; those who keepe the stuffe, receive equall reward with the combatants. I doe therefore conclude , Hee who hath the largest affections, hath most of God, most of his image, which is renewed in knowledge.

Thirdly, sometimes it hapneth, that those who have the largest knowledge, have the most enlarged affections, even to our eye ; and this is happinesse indeed. I confesse, it doth not so seeme to an eye that would read it running ; but if it be exactly looked on, if it be presented to our view in the pourtrait of an example, I thinke it will be very cleare.

David

Know-
ledge ,
where it
is eminent
in truth as
well as ap-
pearance ,
there affe-
ction is e-
qually e-
minent.

David and
Salomon
compared
with Paul.

David and *Salomon* compared with *Paul*, will be as a thousand witnesses. The two first doe seeme to outstrip all men in affection, they are brim-full, running over.

For, *David* is stiled the sweet Singer of Israel ; in his Psalmes he is ever magnifying the rich mercies of God, singing forth the praises of God, chusing rather to be a doore-keeper in the house of God, than to dwell in the tents of *Mesech*: making his Word to be a light unto his feet, and a lanthorn unto his paths, placing all his delight in the Law of the Lord.

Salomon is the happy Penman of that Hymne, which by the Spirit is stiled the Song

Song of Songs. Yet for all this, even in this, they are both exceeded by Saint Paul.

But some, it may be, will imagine those Worthies to be endowed with higher gifts of Nature and Art, than *S. Paul*: and then they will give all the glory to *their understanding*, and not to *their affections*.

If it be so, I confesse I have not fitly chosen my Opposites; But the truth will then appeare in Them, without comparison distinctly.

For, if in affection they exceed all, and in abilities are as *Saul*, taller than their brethren by head and shoulders, then is it manifest in them, that eftsone men of

E the

the most raised parts, of highest abilities, doe superabound in *love*.

But, if, in things which are not directly of Faith, I could cease to be a Sceptique, I should with that most Reverend Worthy, *Thomas Goodwin*, give Saint *Paul* for head and heart, that Throne in heaven which is placed next to Jesus Christ. But *secret things belong to God*; let us onely compare their eminency here below. I think it will be out of question, that Saint *Paul* was the most excellent. For, though *Salomon* (there I suppose will be the difficulty) be said to be the wisest of men, that ever were, that ever should be; yet that is to be applied onely to Govern-

vernment, and (if it may reach so farre) to his excellent skill in naturall Philosophy.

View but Saint *Paul*, and see whether he doth not excell in every thing. He had gathered up vast learning at the feet of *Gamaliel*; for his parts he was advanced to eminent power in Church and Common-wealth. He saith of himselfe, *I profited in the Iewes religion above many my equalls in my owne nation, being more exceedingly zealous of the traditions of my fathers.* And after his conversion, he was judged the only man fit to contend with the Philosophers at Athens. For they who seemed to be somewhat, in conference added nothing

Solomons preeminence in knowledg extended to Politicks, and naturall Philosophy only.

2 Cor. 12. 3

to him. And therefore to him was committed the unravelling of all the difficult knots. It is he that disputes about meates, long haire, divorces, irregular partings of husband and wife. It is he that openeth the nature of prophecie, evinceth the resurrection from the dead, maintaineth justification by faith. And that he may be perfect in knowledge, God is pleased (whether in the flesh or spirit, he knoweth not) to take him into the third heavens: and there he was so filled with Revelation, that God was forced to put the *Philomela*-Thorne under his breast, that hee might not fall into the sleep of sin, and so give himselfe up (as *Sampson*) into the hands

hands of Philistine enemies. And yet this man exceeds all men in affections, and in his affections surpasseth all his other excellencies. It is hee that is often in journies, in perils of waters, in perils of robbers, in perils by his owne nation, in perils amongst the Gentiles, in perils in the city, in perils in the wilderness, in perils in the sea, in perils amongst false Brethren, in wearinesse and painefulnesse, in watchings often, in hunger and thirst, in fastings often, in cold & nakednesse. And as he saith of himselfe, *who was weak and I was not weak? who was offended and I did not burne?* It is hee that fought with the beasts at Ephesus. He

2 Cor. II.
26.

is content not onely to bee bound, but to die for Christ.

Good Saint *Paul* was so tender over his kinsmen according to the flesh, that for their sakes he could willingly be content to be separated from the love of the Lord Jesus Christ. And this is greater love than that which Christ mentioneth; for no man had then shewed greater love than to die; but this holy Saint will goe one step further, he will suffer an eternall death for his friend.

Thus, if suffering either for the head, or members, for the Church, or Christ, will discover affection, I suppose hee will merit the Garland.

And

And as a complement and crowne of all, if to live be most for Gods glory, though death be his advantage, he is resolved to submit, making obedience to Christ in life and death, his gaine and triumph.

I confesse, when he travelleth through those brier disputes, he cannot display such sparkling vivid affections: But when hee hath gotten but a little above those lime-twigs, how doth he mount on high, and there, upon even wings, disdain all things below, triumphing in the imbraces of his Saviour, who is to him more choice than the choicest of ten thousand?

If what I have attempted to prove, be true, as I hope

True
knowledg,
true affe-
ction, se-
parated,
from all
appearan-
ces or out-
ward ad-
vantages
of the bo-
dy, or the
like, are
one.

it is, then Consider,
Either those who^e are e-
minent in affection, and o-
therwise know little; or
those who, as they abound
in one, are also Masters in
the other: Distinguish ap-
pearances from truth; Rea-
ding, memory, discourses,
effects of sense or com-
plexion, from that which
entreteth the soule, becom-
meth reall there, acteth,
floweth from thence as a
spring: And then will you
conclude, that all knowledg
lieth in the affection; that
all knowledge is but one,
differing onely in degrees.

And lastly, that all, whe-
ther knowledge or affecti-
on, is but the *Truth*, that spi-
rituall ray of heavenly
light which God is pleased
to

to present to our view under severall shapes, yet is but one and the same Being, *scil. light and truth.*

CHAP. X.

That all the severall and particular actings of the soule, are this one light and truth.

THUS have I dispatch't the first discourse of the generall form and nature of the Understanding. Now concerning the particular and various workings thereof, in conclusions, simple apprehensions, negations and affirmations, &c. which seeme to be the offspring of the first and original

Apprehensions, conclusions, affirmations, &c. all one truth in the soule.

ginall Being; even these, I hope to prove all one and the same, as with themselves, so with the former, all conjoyned in one Being of *light* and *truth*. That is truth in the fountaine, *this* in the streames; and no man will deny the fountaine and streame to make one river. Onely, sometimes it appeareth in such a shape, sometimes in another, but is still the same soule.

The operations of the soule are proved one with the essence thereof.

This will appeare if wee compare the nature of the Soule or Understanding (for we have proved them both one) with their irradiations, actings and severall emanations. *Res enim dignoscende sunt ex causis*. Now, we conceive the first Being to be no other thing, than

than *activity*, so confest by all. And if you would know what an *activity* is, you shall finde it to be either *potentia agendi*, or *ipsa actio*, or rather *actus primus* & *actus secundus*.

If it be *actus*, either *Primus* or *Secundus* (for *primus* and *secundus* are to me differenc'd onely by time, and so not differenc'd at all, (of which I will presently speak a little more) it must be still in work, and is no longer than it acts. Now, what can this act be in this subject, whereof we discourse, but the reasonable working of the soule in this or that conclusion? If it be any other than a work of reason, how can it constitute, or become the forme of a rationall soule and humane understand-

derstanding? If it be such, how differs it from thought, ratiocination or positions in the minde?

The activity which is the form of the soul, not different from the actions thereof.

Whilst then these conclusions, sayings, actions, are the forme of that truth, of that universall first truth, they must be that truth. For, *forma quæ dat esse, est esse*, and whatsoever is the forme of any thing, that is the Being of it. For, Being and Forme are but one.

If the forme of this activity be not these reasonable workings, it must be something either of a baser allay, or of a higher stamp.

Not of a higher straine.

If the latter; then you speak of Angels or some other spiritual Being, if there be any which is more noble than the soule. And then
how

how doth this excellency discover it selfe? Where or what is it? How is it said that Action is the perfection of all things?

If the former; then *first* you descend to some lower degree of existency; for, all Being is but an activity; and according to the glory or baseness of that activity, doth the Being receive denomination.

Nor of a lower.

Or *secondly*; Shall the cause be more ignoble than the effects? What then? If it be neither more excellent, nor lower, is it various, hath it lesse or more of action? still you fall at the same stone.

Neither can it be various.

But they who approve of the distinction of *actus primus* and *actus secundus*, think they

they save all by the distinction of substance and accident ; So, with them, *actus primus* is the Being, the substance it selfe : and *actus secundus* is the product of that Being or accident belonging to that which they make a soule ; and thus forgetting this, that *omnis virtus consistit in actione*, they make the soule a meere virtuall Being.

The distinction betweene *actus primus* and *actus secundus*, examined.

But, besides that the former Reasons are not thus everted, of these men I should ask this question.

What is this their *actus primus* ? What is the forme of it ? What is with them the forme of a reasonable soule ?

Is not Reason ? can there then be a soule, till there be reason ?

reason? And this Reason is not *potentia ratiocinandi*, but *Ratio*. For, if you distinguish between the act and power, the act must ever be first in order, dignity, and nature.

So then, What is the form of this *primus actus*? is not some act? if it be, it must exist; else you will allow it but a bare notionall Being, which lyeth in the apprehension. And if it doth exist, must it not be this which you call *actus secundus*?

If it be not an act, they make it nothing but a power, a faculty depending upon something else. And if this be the nature of the first, what can the second Being (which is the effect, and so lower)

The distinction
betweene
Substance
and Acci-
dent cal-
led into
question.

lower) be, but a bare notion?

If here were fit place, I might perhaps set upon the Rack that long-famous Distinction of *Substance* and *Accident*, wherby It should be forced to confesse it selfe an aged imposture, at least in the generall and frequent acceptance.

But the activity consisting in the action, That and It shall both be proved but one; and so, *actus primus* and *actus secundus* are this same truth, this light which I plead for.

CHAP. XI.

*An objection answered, in
which the nature of Time
and Place are touched.*

YEt this doth exceedingly stumble mens thoughts; wee see various actings of the soule, distinguished by the circumstances of Time and Place; there are severall distinct actings; are there then so many severall soules?

First, I could justly give this answer; When these men can tell me what *time* and *place* is, I doe hope I shall finde both time and place to dissolve the difficulties.

Second-

Secondly, I shall, I suppose, both by reason and their owne assertions in the like case, prove that *time* and *place* are nothing, or alter nothing in this point; and that, these *simile's* will a little irradiate.

The nature of
Beauty illustrating
time and
place.

Beauty (if I bring not the exact discription of the learned, yet I shall remember so much as concerneth the point in hand) consists in complexion, in lineaments, and in harmony.

Complexion draweth his Being from colour, from the subject wherein colour is seated, the spirits which give a Being to this colour, &c. and these are differenced by many circumstances. Lineaments as they are adorned by, so are they the
orna-

ornaments of this complexion. And these againe are diuers from themselves, and diuers from Harmony. And yet, by Harmony, these make up one sweet, one pleasant Being, which we call Beauty.

A Flame rising from diuers thornes, is not many, is but one flame. A streame filled with various springs, is not various, is but one streame. So is it in our case.

Those Circumstances of time and place, differencing these various Beings, are something, or nothing.

If nothing, the objection is answered.

If something, they are a piece of the whole, they serve to make up that harmony,

Time and
Place no-
thing diffe-
rent from
the essence
of the soul.

mony, which we call Beauty, κόσμος. Thus time and place, with all Beings of the like nature, are either nothing, or else they have a share in the Being, and make up the *totum Compositum*.

The Soule is but one Act distinguished to our notion by severall apparitions; and these intervals, with all variations, either are nothing, or are of the nature of the Soule, and serve to make up that consort, that truth, that life that we now discourse of.

And that this is so, I hope by this cleere ratiocination to leave you assured.

Time and Place seeme to me nothing but an extrinsecall modification of a thing. I cannot finde that the learned

ned have made any thing at all of them. Let us survey them, as they define them, when they treat of them; as they esteeme them, when they meete them occasionally.

How hath *Aristotle* defined Place? *Est superficies concava corporis ambientis*; Where is the truth of this in the highest heaven which incompasseth all the rest? Hath *Ramus* any whit advanced the cause in his definition? *Est subjectum rei locatæ*; *Idem per Idem*! Are not those who propound, and they who entertain such a definition, justly compared to the Constable and the Country-Justice? The first having received from some higher power a Warrant,

The definitions of time and place rejected.

Place.

rant, wherein was this hard word, *Invasion*; repaired to his Rabbi for Solution: he, that the question might seeme somewhat obscure, paused a little, that it might not shame him; after he had consulted, in a stroke or two with his grave-learned beard, replied; the sense of this word is very plaine, it is *Invasion*, it signifieth *Invasion*; with which the Constable being fully satisfied, gave him many thanks and departed. *Locus* and *spatium corporis locati*, is little better; what have we in this definition, of the intrinsecall nature of place? So that, if I be not wholly blinde, they, whilst they treat of it as Scholars, make it nothing: when they make use of it by
the

the By, it is the same. As, the Soule, they say, is *tota in toto*, and *tota in qualibet parte*; whilst they spread and diffuse the soule over the whole body, from one extremity to the other, *Place* maketh no division in the soule; it is but one soule, yet extended quite through the body. Angels are *definitivè in loco*; that place which is within the circumference so limited, doth not at all cause them to make two in this angelicall Being.

I may affirme the same of time, *Tempus est mensura motus*; What doe I know of time by this? how can I from hence ghesse time to have so considerable a Being, as that it shall make two of that whith otherwise

Time.

wise would be but one? In the Deity we are sure it can have no such effect. In the Deity wee have creation, preservation, redemption, decree, and execution of that decree. All these to our apprehension are distinguished by time: and yet no man will say, that in God they are two: for God is *purus actus, nulla potentia*.

But you will say, this is *obscurum per obscurius*, and not to unmask and unveile difficulties: Which no *Simile* taken from the Divinity can doe, because That is all mysticall.

To which I answer, *Si magnis licet componere parva*, wee shall finde the same in our selves, we shall find that
Time

Time doth not at all difference, or any way act. I suppose it is cleare, that Place hath lost all place and credit in this argumentation. Why may not I say the same of Time, seeing by all mens confessions they are twins of the same womb? But secondly, I affirme this, (and I hope truly) that if you make Time any thing, you annihilate all the act of the Creation; that is, you will admit of no one perfect action. A thought, I confesse, passeth in a moment; and yet, in this moment, under this moment, are many subdivisions of Time. We have in an houre, an halfe, a quarter, a minute, a second, (the 60 part of a minute:) & how many subdivisions will

All actions
nothing,
if time be
any thing.

a scruple admit of? For ought I know, Time and *punctum Physicum* agree in this, that they are *divisibilia in infinitum*. If then you will make so many thoughts in a thought, as you have divisions under a scruple, you will have no perfect thought, no compleat act. To shun this, you wil confesse that Time doth not divide one act alone: but one Act or thought comprehendeth many Times. Why may not I say, that if Time doth not parcell out one act, it cannot act upon two, when the duality ariseth onely from Time? This not being well weighed, hath cast our wits upon strange rocks, hath raised this Question,

How

How doth God see things ?

If in their existencies, then all things are co-eternall with God : if in their Causes onely, then all things are not present with God ; but you must admit of succession, a former and a latter, to eye divine ; which is blasphemy. This *dilemma* seemeth strong ; but it is because we make Time something : whereas indeed all things did exist in their Beings with God *ab omni eterno*. For, *eternum* & *tempus* are all one in eternity : and this succession is but to our apprehension.

Thus, if Time and Place be nothing, I hope the weight of this objection is is taken off.

The difficulty untied, how God seeth things.

But I foresee another objection.

Object. If Time and Place be nothing, if all our Actions are but One : How can there be evill and good?

Answ. I fully conclude with *Aristotles* Adversaries *Anaxagoras*, *Democritus*, &c That Contradictions may be *simul* & *semel* in the same Subject, same Instant, same Notion (not onely in two distinct respects, or notions, as one thing may be *causa* & *effectum*, *Pater* & *Filius*, *respectu diversi* ; but even in the same respect, under one and the same Notion.) For, *Non ens* is nothing ; and so, the Being which it hath, may subsist with that which contradicts it. I speake in their termes.

Now

Now, let us view our actions, either

as { Many, in pieces, or,
 { One entire act.

As many; impute Transgression to what you please, either to the effects in the body, or the Will, and its workings: all these, so farre as they have Being, are good; for, all Being is good. Where then is the sinne? Certainly, sinne lieth in this, that there is not so full a goodnesse as there should. Sin is onely a Privation, a Non-Entity: But, a Privation, a Non-Entity may subsist (according to the subsistence it hath) with Being. Such a co-existence of Entity and Non-Entity, was in his faith, who cried, *Lord, I beleieve, help my unbelieve.*

liefe. This Contradiction (of Entity, Non-Entity) must be in the selfe-same Act, (and not in two distinct Acts:) else the Act is perfect, (having complete Entity, goodnesse, without admixture of Non-Entity:) and *so* is onely the Creator: or else it is more imperfect than *Beelzebub*; for, It is Bad, and no Good, Non-Entity wholly, and no Entity, and *so* no Action.

Thus we see Good and Evill may co-exist in severall, in particular Actions; Why then *not so*, if all Acts should bee but one entire Act, undistinguisht by Time or Place? If the members composing the Body, have matter and forme, why then
not

not the whole Body? Sinne in it selfe is *nothing*, only a *non-conformity* to Gods Law.

The Twilight hath not *so much* light and *so much* positive darknesse: only it hath not *so much* light as Noon in cleare day. Here's the defect: and by this defect, Light and Darknesse co-exist in the same point of ayre.

So, though our Acts bee but one, undivided by Time and Place: yet, to our grieve, are not free from Sinne.

Thus the Soule, Truth, Light, is alwayes and continually one, though it appeareth otherwise to me: and this appearance ought not to dazle the sight of the truth; for, as they say of honour, *Honor est in honorante,*

norante: so may I say of apprehension, *Apprehensio est in apprehendente*: the thing is still the same, let my apprehension bee what it will bee.

The same truth taking various shapes in our apprehensions.

I doe not reject the phrases of severall truths, and severall actings of this truth: for, *Loquendum cum vulgo*; yet, phrases must not mislead us. For whilst I confesse *loquendum esse cum vulgo*, I professe that *sapiendum est cum paucis*. For, to our apprehension, that truth which is but one, doth variegate it selfe, and take divers shapes.

Set forth by a similitude taken from the Sun.

As that Sun which is one and the same, is ruddy in the morning, cleere at noone-day; of a moderate heate early, and at mid-day rather torrid.

Various

Various colours meeting in the same point, to make up one indivisible act of sense, are by it judged divers Beings, whereas they all make up but one Being; they are but one and the same object of sense. Reason, which is exalted above Sense, telleth us it must be so; because that act of life is but one, and the Sense is not an Ubiquitary; it cannot act upon any more than one at once.

The Trigonall Glasse paints out to us *more*, and *more lively* colours in every object (which as a *medium* it presents to the eye) *than* are in the Iris; yet, This object, may be but some duskyish sad thing, in which there is no change of colours at all.

The same act of sense perfectly one, yet varied unto many formes.

A Similitude from the trigonall glasse.

Sense con-
futed by
Copernicus.

* Copernic.
Kepler. Ga.
lileus de
Galil:

The three leading Senses have confuted Copernicus these many yeares; for the eye seeth the circulations of the Heavens; we feele our selves upon a stable and firme foundation; and our eares heare not from the volutations of the Earth such a black *Cant* as her heavy rowlings would rumble forth: and yet now if we will beleeeve our * new Masters, sense hath done as sense will doe, misguided our Reason.

When the nimble juglers play their pranks, you see and heare, yet neither see nor heare. So your sense is no good judge. • Thus let the soule be raised to its supreme height of power, and it will cleerely see, that
all

all the actings of reason which seeme severall (bee they, as we think, distinguished by time and place) are but one, a fixt entire unity.

CHAP. XII.

Another objection is answered, drawn from the falshood in the workings of the soule.

BUt if these particular actings of truth, are truth; then when this Being, which wee have so long discoursed of, acteth not truth, it ceaseth to bee: and so, where the soule entertaineth or pronounceth a false position, the soule is no more it selfe.

Object.

Grant

Successi-
on of mo-
ments, ap-
parent, not
reall

The soule
never acts
falsly.

Grant that it is with the soule in this moment of time, when it acts upon falsehood, as when it acts not, and so is not ; yet you will advance nothing, till you can prove the succession of moments to have a reall being. By former discourse, I hope it is cleare, that Time is but a Nominall Being, and then this cessation depending on that distinct moment, which is not, is likewise it selfe an imagination.

But secondly, I will allow it, when any man can shew me that Falshood is a reall being, which the soule or truth can worke upon; For, in every apprehension two things are to be weighed; The Agent it selfe, and the Subject acted upon, (I speake

speake now in other mens language ; for I conceive the Agent together with the Subject to be One in the act.) Truth is alwayes truth, *Nemine dubitante* ; and so it must be true, whilst it acteth on a truth. If that be True, which it acts upon, then all is well ; if it be False, it is a vanity, a lye, a nothing. For, if Falshood have a Being, then wee must either with the Manichees, make Two sources of Being, or else God must be the author of it ; which no man will affirme.

If then it have no Being, the Soule cannot act in it, and so it cannot be the act of the Soule ; For, how shall the soule or truth act upon nothing ?

But

Object.

But the Soule doth act,
when it pronounceth a false
position?

Resp.
In false
propositi-
ons of the
soule, so
farre as it
acts, it acts
truly :
where it
is decei-
ved, it is
by not
acting.

He that in the twilight,
mistaketh a man for a tree,
acteth right in what he see-
eth ; and when he raiseth a
false conclusion upon the
premisses, he acteth not.
For, how is it possible, that
a man should act falshood,
a vanity, nothing ?

In this action, there are
two things ; There is the see-
ing a Being, and the seeing
it under a confused notion.
Or, which is the same,

You may observe, first, the
opining ; secondly, the opi-
ning uncertainly or falsly.

The opining, is a good
act, none will deny ; to think,
let it be what it will be,
is good.

But

But secondly, the so-thinking, is that which is obscure. Now certainly, the *formalis ratio* of this so-thinking, lyeth in thinking of error, which is nothing; and in thinking of nothing, the the soule cannot act; for, nothing produceth nothing.

A man, who catcheth at the shadow of a Hornet, acteth rightly in catching, and stingeth not himselfe; because he apprehendeth onely the shadow; because so far he doth not act; for to catch a shadow, to catch nothing, and not to act, are *idem*. And thus, whilst the soule catcheth at a false position, it graspeth but the shadow, which can be nothing, seeing evill is. nothing.

thing; *ergo*, it loseth not truth; for it pronounceth nothing but the truth of the position.

Paine hath
no recall
Being.

The same may be said for *Paine*. I conceive, it cannot act upon the soule, nor the soule upon it, because, it is but a bare privation of spirit and strength. And upon this ground, I shall subscribe to that opinion propounded by that reverend, worthy, that quick-sighted Balearian-jaculator, Mr *Dr Twisse*: Whether it be not better to be in perpetuall paine, than not to be at all. If *Paine* be but a bare privation, certainly Any Being is more desirable, than, for feare of a privation (a not-being) to become *no-Being*.

Hic

Mart. lib. 2.

Epigr. 80.

Hic rogo, non furor est, ne moriari, mori ? If any man shall tell me I speak against sense, I shall modestly ask him this Question: Whether it be not *impar congressus* betwixt Sense and Reason: and whether, in that case, Sense be an equall judge. Reason telleth us, that *Paine* must either be something, or nothing; if *nothing*, then it is but a privation; if *something*, it must be either good, or evill; if *good*, it cannot (as hath, and will yet appeare more in this Pamphlet) hurt us; if *evill*, it is either a *nominall* evill, or *reall*; if it be named an evill, and is not, it will not be disputed; but if it be a *Reall* evill, then it is nothing; for, *Evill*, by consent

sent of all, is nothing but privation of good. In this case shall Reason or Sense guide, judge You.

CHAP. XIII.

Discovering the consequences of this Position, that All things are one Truth.

SIR,

WHEN you collect your thoughts, and passe sentence upon these unsheaved gleanings, your gentlenes (though the papers merit no such favour) wil smile upon them; and say, here our eyes indeed are pleased with the curiosity of *Pallas* her needle: but, what hath *Reason* to work upon?

upon? what is the usefulness of this more than *Arachne's* web? more than to entangle empty wits withall? What fruit doth it yeeld better than the Silkworme, which is worne onely for ostentation? Give me leave to plead for my own. Our own (you know, though black) is comely to Our selves.

If This were well weighed, that all things are but one emanation from power divine: If this were taken fully into the Understanding, that wee might be said to live upon, to live in this truth; we should live more Christianly, more cheerfully.

*Non est vivere, sed valere,
vita.*

The happiness of our lives advanced by this opinion.

*Mart. li. 6.
Ep. 70.*

I say more cheerfully, more Christianly, in a few moments, than we doe now in the whole course of our distracted time. And you will more easily consent to this, if you doe consider that our happinesse is compounded of two Simples only, which are so enertwined, as that they may seeme One,

The first is to *know*.

The second, to *doe* what is right and good.

Of the former, the Theoreticall part, I shall speake hereafter. In the Practick, Two things are considerable,

First, that, Action dependeth wholly upon knowledge. And, of Knowledge, this is the well-spring and rule, that, *Vnity is all*. The Spirit

This Vnity
the foun-
taine of
knowledg.

Spirit saith, *How can you love whom you doe not know?* and I may say, *How can you do what you know not?*

The Not-knowledge of of what is right, with-holdeth from, and wearieeth in action; if perchance wee ever have any glimmering of light. For, *Ignorance* bringeth this *double* evill with it.

Action
wholly depends on
knowledg.

First, it leadeth into Error; and Error (simply in the view of it) giveth no content.

Secondly, in the progresse it wearieeth and distracteth. One who is lost in a Wood, suffereth as much in seeking as losing the way. Whereas, if we Knew aright, how even and smooth would be the way of action, and how great

great our contents therein?

Secondly, not only all our actions turn upon this hinge; but out of this treasury issueth forth the whole complacency that wee gather from, or receive in action. For, if wee knew this truth, that all things are *one*; how cheerfully, with what modest courage should wee undertake any action, re-incounter any occurrence, knowing that that distinction of misery and happinesse, which now so perplexeth us, hath no Being, except in the Brain? Wee should not need to check and raise our selves with *Dauids* out-cryes, *why art thou cast downe my soule, why art thou disquieted within me?* Our Spirits could

could with him wait upon God; make him our only rock, and then wee should not be moved. We should not call for *Epicætus* nor *Boëtius de consolatione Philosophicâ*; wee might fetch our cures from our own bowels, if from this one truth of unity wee could conclude these two things.

First, that Misery is nothing, and so cannot hurt.

Secondly, that every thing that is, is good, and good to me: then we might sing with a joyfull spirit, *O nimium, nimiumque beati*; and upon sure ground; for, whilst I being a Being, am Good, and that other Being is Good, and these Two Goods can fall under no other difference, but of degrees,

grees; Good & Good, cannot but agree, and so must be good to me.

Ob.

If any man shall say, that the overflowing of another mans good, may be my evil; they mis-take; for, such a thought is a falshood; and, as I have already proved, Falshood is nothing, and so cannot hurt.

Risp.

That such a thought is falshood, I suppose this will cleare it.

The Philosophers fancy to themselves *animam mundi*, and say every parcell is as a Simple contributing to the existence of that *Compositum*. But Christians know, and I have (if I mistake not) evinced, that, all Being is *but one emanation from above*, diversified onely in our apprehen-

prehension. How can then one piece of that Being impeach the other, one part of the Soule quarrell with the other? As the *will* (speaking in their termes) with the *sensitive faculty*; or the *Eye* with the *Belly*: the vanity whereof *Esop* hath taught us long agoe. So, of necessity, if either my *envy*, or anothers *folly*, lay me low, because my brother is exalted, this must be a lie, and so cannot hurt. *E contrario*, the Good of another, being the perfection of the whole, is my advantage. If with this eye you view that Scripture, *Is thine eye evill, because thy brothers good increaseth?*

All things
one piece.

Mat. 20. 15

The rule, you see is, that I should rejoyce at the well-
G fare

Propriety
maketh
lovely.

fare of another. Now what is the reason of the rule? Philosophy teacheth us, that it is not onely ἀγαθόν, but ἰδιον, that is, lovely. If then I must rejoyce, I rejoyce because of some propriety, and this propriety ariseth from Unity; this Alkermes of Unity, cheereth the drooping spirit, cureth the *atrabilis* of Melancholy. The same potion easeth the heart of envyings, censurings and whisperings. So he, who knoweth that injuries, because they are nothing, cannot hurt; and good things, though anothers, doe serve him; cannot cherish such viperous starvelings in his thoughts.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIIII.

*The benefit which Knowledge
and all Sciences receive from
this assertion.*

Have in a word
showne how Uni-
ty untyeth all dif-
ficulties, unites all happi-
nesse in *practicall* things.
Permit me to discover what
influence it hath upon that
other simple, which maketh
up the compound of our
happinesse, (*scil.*) *Theorie.*

Tully saith of *Epicurus*,
Frangit, non dividit ; The
breaking of learning into
so many Sciences, is but
making so many miles,
that so the Master may
have more hire for his post-
horse.

The vani-
ty of di-
viding
knowledg
into many
Sciences.

horse. They forget, that, *vita est brevis*, whilst *ars est longa*. It were much better if all Learning were like the chaine fastned at *Iupiters* Throne, all of a piece: Or the Beame, which from the Sunne by a continuall tract of irradiation toucheth the treasures of the earth.

To the effecting of this, that learned, that mighty man *Comenius* doth happily and rationally indeavour to reduce *all* into *one*. Why doe wee make Philosophy and Divinity two Sciences? What is True Philosophy but Divinity? and if it be not True, it is not Philosophy.

Confusions from
division in
knowledg.

Doe but see a little in particulars, the fruit of such like divisions. •

In the knowledge of Beings, we must observe

First, that, Being is :

Secondly, What it is.

There is the 3⁷¹, and the 3¹⁰⁷¹. What a tedious work doth this very division lay upon us? Alas, the very first, the easiest part of it, will take up all our time; and to ascend to causes before we know that there are effects; is to mount the highest round, before we ascend the first. And therefore that learned wit, Sir *Francis Bacon*, in his naturall Philosophy, bringeth onely experiments, leaving the search of causes to those, who are content, with *Icarus*, to burne their wings at a fire too hot for them. Indeed, sometimes as an imbellish-

Knowledg
double, of
Beings, &
of their
Causes.

Knowledg
of Beings
twofold,
of their
existen-
cies, and
their na-
tures.

ment of his discourse, that he may please stirring fancy, he interlaceth some causes, yet gently and modestly propoundeth them, but as for entertainment. If now our humble spirits could be content to see all things, as they are, but one, onely bearing different shapes, we should according to that rule, *Noli altum sapere*, improve in what we know, and there sit downe. But our spirits are mighty *Nimrods*, hunting after knowledge, venturing all, to eate of the tree of knowledge of good and evill. Which curiositie of ours, is wittily reprov'd by Sir Iohn Davies;

*Why did my Parents send
me to the Schooles,
That*

*That I with knowledg might
enrich my minde :
When the desire to know,
first made men fooles.
And did corrupt the root
of all mankinde.*

And for this reason we lose
with *Esops* Dog, the substance,
and get not the shadow.

Causes we cannot, neither
shall ever finde out : The
knowledg of existencies we
omit ; they are too voluminous,
if we did attempt ; and
so much doubted of by men,
that what to think, we know
not. View all Learning, and
see how the very Being of
things, is questioned in Natural
Philosophy. Amongst
the *Quadrupedes*, wee question
the existence of the

Knowledg
of existencies
necessary, but
altogether
uncertain.

Unicorne : *inter volatilia*, the Phoenix, and the Bird of Paradise : amongst *Fishes*, the Mer-maid. When we seek into *Minerals*, we finde not *Ebur fossile*; the incomparable vertues of it wee meet with in all Physicians: but the subject of so many excellencies, we doubtfully hope for. Of *herbes and plants*, Bookes name many which gardens, meadowes, rivers afford not : If they ever were, we may give them to *Pancirolla*, that he may reckon them with *perpetuum mobile*, the Philosophers stone, *cum multis alijs*, *inter Inventa perdita* : For every age interreth old things, and is againe fertile of new births.

If we were mighty men,

as

as *Adam*, that all the creatures would come and present themselves to our view: yet (which is the second part of this first Question) we could not give them their names according to their natures. For when we doe know that any Being doth exist, we doe not know what their formes, their severall qualities and temperaments are. We altogether are ignorant of herbes and plants; which are hot and cold, in how many degrees they are so. For in these, how many, how eternall are the debates? Some deny the healing vertue to *Dictamnium*. Some question the nature of that killing-saving Indian herb, *Hen-man-bane*, *Tobacco*: whose insolence is

Knowledge of the natures more uncertain than the existencies.

such, as to make That part of man a chimney, an outlet of her smoky birth (expressed happily by Doctor *Thorry* in these words, *Inq; tubo genitas haurire & reddere nubes:*) I say, to make That an outlet of her smoky birth, by which the old Romans (in this their Proverb, *Est homo nasutus*) discovered their judgements of gifts and wit. Some say it is hot, and some say it is cold. Few of the Learned, consent about the degrees of heat and cold in any Simple, and so are forced to palliate all with the gaudy mantle of *occulta qualitas*; Yet what are all these but matter of observation? manifest effects, which Sense teacheth the plowman, the Countryman,

man, yea the brutes themselves, as familiarly, as warmth in the Sun-shine, and wet in the Raine. I could name many questions in * Politickes, Oeconomickes, Ethickes, &c. the very subject whereof are in dispute. But they will more happily fall in, when I discover our ignorance in causes.

* As all those laws concerning slaves, whereas a slave indeed is *non ens*, for if any man have given

away, with *Esau*, his birth-right, yet he hath not lost it; because manhood and religion are not *mei juris*; they are talents which G^d hath intrusted me with, and are no more deputable, than places of *jud. captiv. e.* *Et sic de cæteris.*

Thus you see in what a Maze you are Meandred, if you admit of any division. The very knowledge of the Being of things, is more than we are capable of. And as yet that is necessary,

In what sense Knowledge of Beings is to be wished.

sary, so we keepe our selves still to this principle, that those things are all of one nature, variegated only in our apprehension: and this knowledge I must consent to.

But if men once seeke into the *Causes* of Subsistencies, I see no reason but they should suffer as *Rei lesa Majestatis*. For these are *Arcana Imperii*, which to meddle with, is no lesse than high Treason.

CHAP. XV.

*Confusion in the knowledge
of Causes, discovered, and
redressed by this Vnity.*

IF wee are thus at a stand, in these very beginnings, what shall wee bee, when wee enquire after Causes? Two lie open to our view. *First*, our great and good *God*, the fountaine of all Being, and this the Ancients styled *Fatum*.

Secondly, there is that *Emanation* from him; which is the first created cause of all Being, and this was *Aristotle's materia prima*, so far as sensible things extend. Which

Two only causes received, God, and emanation from God.

Aristotles materia prima brought to light.

Which because it is the substance of all things, and the variations of it make all *formes*; therefore in it selfe, he described it to be neither *quid*, *quale*, nor *quantum*.

All other causes are better knowne by name, than in the natures of them. They make many, as *Efficient*, *Finall*, *Materiall*, *Formall*; with divers subdistinctions; as instrumentall, exemplary, &c. All these have matter and forme. For, there is a matter, and forme of a materiall cause, and forme and matter of formall causes. For in a table of wood, the materiall cause is not the matter, wood: wood is the subject, upon which this materiall cause bringeth forth that effect, a Table.

Matter &
Forme
have their
matter and
forme,
both of
which
meet in
the eman-
ation.

a Table. It may bee the materiall cause shall not be Physicall matter; wee shall by and by finde it another name.

Of the forme of a materiall cause, I shall say nothing, and so for formall causes.

Faith is said to be the forme of a Christian, and faith hath its forme. The soule is by many deemed (which I understand not) the forme of the reasonable creature, and it hath a particular individuall forme. And thus both materiall and formall causes have matter and forme.

Matter againe, is either *Physicall* and substantiall, or metaphoricall and *metaphysicall*. And this is the name
I pro-

I promised even now.

Formes are either intrinsecall, or extrinsecall : the intrinsecall are Logicall, Metaphysicall, &c.

Now have you various and severall kinds of forms; but who knoweth the least considerable part of matter or forme ? Who will not cleerly lose himselfe in such an inquest ? May we not say of these, what one saith wittily of the Soule ?

*For, Her true forme, how can
my sparke discern,
which dim by nature, Art
did never cleere :
when the great wits, of whom
all skill we learne,
Are ignorant, both what
she is, and where ?*

Doe but survey the Physicall Beings of our Philosophers, with what impossible, with what unnecessary scrutinies of causes, do they weary themselves, and their Disciples?

The vaine
search of
causes in
Physicks.

Till *numeri Platonici* cease to be a Proverb, I must remaine a Sceptick, although one undertake to teach me, *how* and *whence* it is, that *various rowlings of the tongue*, shall send forth so many articulate voices, and so many severall languages.

Till it be known, how all numbers gather themselves into an Unity, I must not give credence to another, who promiseth an accompt of the estuation of the Sea.

I know some surrender
Neptunes Trident to the
Moone,

*Platonici;
who make
the world
animal ma-
gnum. Vide
Gal. in Sy-
stem. Pto-
lem. & Co-
pernic. Ke-
plers Harmo.

Moone, and there fix the reason of *Thetis* her uncertain ebbings. Others *give the world a good paire of lungs, and from these Bel- lowes expect the causes of what they inquire for. Others take a dish of water, and shaking it up and down, think to cleere this difficul- ty. But these their ratioci- nations discover cleerly, that with NOAH'S Dove, through over-much water, they can finde no ground for footing. For *veritas non querit angulos*. And if the reason were ready, they would not have disputed; and yet they are very confi- dent; and why may not they be so, who dare venture to give (before they prove any Orbs) the government of the

the Orbs to a band of celestiall intelligences?

I shall not wonder, if these men every where finde an *Euripus*, and at its bankes imitate their Grandy's* out-cry, *Quia ego non possum te capere, tu me capias.*

Aristot.

How doth the Spirit be-foole these men? First hee telleth them, that they are so farre from finding out the *Causes*, that they are ignorant of the *Effects*: Knowest thou the time when the wild Goats of the rock bring forth? or canst thou mark when the Hindes doe calve? Canst thou number the moneths that they fulfill, or knowest thou the time when they bring forth?

Iob 39.1,2.

Salomon saith, There are three things too wonderfull for

Prov. 30.

18. 19.

See Aristot.
de mundo,
de celo &c.

for me; yea, foure which I know not. The way of an Eagle in the aire, the way of a serpent upon a rocke, the way of a ship in the midst of the sea, and the way of a man with a maid.

How doth our great Master perplexe himselfe in the inquiry of causes? Sometimes he makes the *principia* of naturall things, to be *contraria*: whereas, neither the heavens, nor the starres, nor any thing that is by univocall generation, is that way produced. Sometimes he allowes three *principia*, *Privatio*, *Materia*, & *Forma*; forgetting his own principle, that *Ex nihilo nihil fit*, not remembring that when hee hath matter and forme, he is yet to seek for the Rock and Pit, out of which

which matter and form are digged and hewed; and therefore instituteth two severall authors, one of matter, another of forme.

I confesse, his Commentators doe file of some rust from these Tenets, but not so cleerely as to make him give the right cause of Being.

Romance's and New-Atlantides, I shall gladly embrace as pleasant and glorious entertainements from specious and Ambrosian wits. But for true knowledge of causes, having no cause to expect, I will not hope.

Sir *Walter Raleigh* saith exceeding well, that the Cheese-wife knoweth that Runnet curdleth Cheese, but

Like *Plato's* and Sir *Francis Bacon's*.

but the Philosopher knoweth not how.

All this while I doe not reject an industrious search after wisdom, though the wisest of men saith, *He that increaseth wisdom, increaseth griefe.*

Verulan:
Augment.
Scient.

I doe only, with Sir Francis Bacon, condemne *doctrinam phantasticam, litigiosam, fucatam, & mollem*; a nice, unnecessary, prying into those things which profit not.

Too great exactnesse in this Learning, hath caused our Meteorologists to blush when their confidence hath proved but a Vapour. Too great hopes of discovering the myserie of nature, hath caused some, contrary to the authority of Scripture
contrary

contrary to the opinion of *Iulius Caesar*, *Picus Mirandula*, *Cornelius à Lapide*, *Ioan. Barclaius*, cum multis aliis, to attribute an *unwarranted* power to the starres over our bodies.

But this ensueth, while we follow, for learning, what is not. And so, that noble comprehensive activity, the soule of man, is hindered from entertaining in its place more generous, more usefull, and sublimated Truths.

How would the soule improve, if all *Aristotles Materia prima*, *Plato's Mens Platonica*, *Hermes Trismegistus* his *νῆς & λόγος*, were converted into some spirituall light? the soule might soare and raise it selfe up to
Univer-

Univerſall Being, bathe it ſelfe in thoſe ſtately, deep, and glorious ſtreames of *Unity*, ſee *God* in *Ieſus Chriſt*, the firſt, chiefe, and ſole *cauſe* of *all Being*: It would not then containe it ſelfe within particular rivulets, in whoſe ſhallow waters it can encounter nothing but ſand or pebbles, ſeeing it may fully delight it ſelfe in the firſt riſe of all delight, *Ieſus Chriſt*.

Thus, when you ſee the face of Beauty, you will perfectly be aſſured how many the ſeverall pieces which make it up, muſt be, what their nature, and their ſeverall proportions. So ſhall you with certainty deſcend to knowledge of exiſtences, eſſences, when you ſhall

shall rest in one universall
cause: and Metaphysicks,
Mathematicks, and Logick
will happily prove *one*, while
they teach the variations of
Vnity through severall num-
bers. All particular Scien-
ces will be subordinate, and
particular applications of
these. So all shall be, accor-
ding to *Ficinus*, *Circulus bo-
ni per bonum in bonum redi-
ens*; and the face of divine
Beauty shall bee unveiled
through all.

H

CHAP.

CHAP. XVI.

The unhappy fruits of Division, in other parts of Learning, made manifest.

Cast your eye on Morall Philosophy; and see how the truth is darkened by distinctions and divisions; How our Masters have set up in the same soule, Two fountains of Reason, the *Will*, and the *Understanding*. Have they not *virtutes Intellectuales & Morales*? Is it not a great question, *Vtrum Prudentia sit Virtus Moralis? Vtrum Summum Bonum sit in Intellectu, an Voluntate? Vtrum Prudentia possit separari à Virtute Morali? Vtrum Virtus Moralis sita sit in Appetitu Rationali,*

nali, an Sensitive?

I say, these questions, especially the dividing of the soule into so many faculties, enthrones many reasonable Beings in the soule. For, when the *will* entertaineth or rejecteth the proposition of the *understanding*, shee must doe it one of these three wayes: Either by an *instinct*; and this men will not have; for, *hoc est brutum*. Or by *chance*; and this many reject; for then she hath no *liberty*. Or by *discourse*; and this most pitch upon; for then she doth exercise *vim illam imperatricem*, which I reade of amongst them, but understand not.

Now, if they conclude upon this *third* way. What

H 2

is

Many reasonable Beings, placed by Philosophy in the Soule.

is this *Discourse*, but the Work of an *Vnderstanding*? if the *will* act that way, which is, or ought to be to the *Vnderstanding proprium quarto modo*; Is not then the *will* an *Vnderstanding*?

Thus like an unskillfull Artist, they mince with distinctions; they *whet*, till there be no more *Steele*: and whilst they would *sharpen*, they *annihilate*: Whilst they would *inlarge*, they *overthrow* the Soule. They create names, and say, with *Ajax*, they are *Vlysses*, and so fight with them. They do, as one saith very well, giving *Passion* eyes, make Reason blind; raising the *will*, they ruine the *Vnderstanding*. *Termini nul-*
los

Enrip.
Traged.

los habent terminos. The poore Soule oppressed with black Melancholy, beleeveth some part of his body as big as a house: and no man can, in his thought, passe, unlesse he remove it: Even so doe those men.

But what may not bee expected from That happy Inventer, and bold Abetter of errors, who with much confidence maintaineth the eternity of the World, against *Hermes, Musæus, Orpheus, Anaxagoras, Linus, &c.* Yet that they may *insanire cum ratione*, they say, that if you raise not up some faculty to contend with the *Vnderstanding*, the *Vnderstanding* seeing right, must ever do right, and

H 3 that

that we by wofull experience know to bee otherwise.

I confesse, whilst the *Vnderstanding* seeth light and right (I now discourse of the *Vnderstanding*, *Will*, *Affections*, &c. in their termes) it doth right; for, seeing and doing is all one; for the act of the Soule is but seeing or discerning. But that *Vnderstanding*, which now did see right perfectly, at the same instant is blind, even in a grosse, absurd thing: and so the effect and birth of it is but darknesse and folly.

Seeing
and doing
one in the
Soule as
knowing
and wil-
ling.

Vanity of
disputes in
Metaphy-
sicks.

In Metaphysicks, with what curious nets do they intangle their hearers? certainly, that should be stiled the Art or Science of Disputes

sputes and *quare's*; for the very Being and *subiectum Metaphysices*, is strongly disputed. Some will have *ens tantum*, the universall nature of *Being*: Others, substances abstract from matter, as Angels, Spirits, Soules of men, to bee the subject of this Learning; And as it beginneth, so it groweth into thousands of disputes.

As, *Vtrum differentia possunt esse sub eodem genere cum illo quod differre faciunt? Vtrum universale sit aliquid reale, an notionale tantum? Vnde rerum individuatione exoritur?*

If I should go through Logick, *Mediocre artem*, Mathematicall Sciences: I should but weary you with

H 4 variety

Darknesse
in Divini-
ty through
the igno-
rance of
unity.

Faith and
Repen-
tance coe-
vall.

variety of opinions.

Even *Divinity* it selfe is darkened with mists of inextricable questions. The questions about *Faith* and *Love*, are sufficient to fill the world with perpetuall quarrels ; As, whether *Faith* precedeth *Repentance* ? which learned Master *Pemble* hath sweetly determined by making both *Faith* and *Repentance* fruits of *semen vivificum*. Whether *Faith* be a particular application of Christ to my selfe, or onely a bare spirituall beleefe, that Christ is the Son of God ? Which Reverend, holy, learned Master *Cotton*, hath most acutely, most truly cleared, by proving that *Faith* can bee nothing but

a laying hold of that promise which God hath made. Now, that promise is, That, *he that beleeveth that Christ is the Sonne of God, shall be saved.*

The generall promise, the object of faith.

Whether faith be a believing that I am saved, or depending upon God for salvation? And here *Bellarmino* hath with mighty wit assaulted our side; for, saith he, if believe be to beleeve I am saved, I was saved without faith. If believe be to beleeve that God will give me grace to be saved, I beleeve before I have grace, before I have faith. Which knot, I know not how to dissolve, but by opening with Reverend Mr. *Cotton* That (and this is another *Quere.*)

H 5

We

Declarativè

We are saved by faith, only *declarativè*. I am saved, not only in the eternall decree, without faith, by Gods free gift (that all consent to) but even in the execution. And when God hath pleased to take me out of eternall darknesse; then faith discovereth to me that I am to be saved; and so, making faith to be a manifestation of that to me, that I am saved, *Belarmine's* objection is answered.

There are many other Questions, but I dare not so much as mention them.

If wee should but survey the disciplinable part of Divinity, we should be confounded with Chiliads of disputes, all which I will wrap up in one, *scil.*

Whether

Whether there be a pre-
script forme of Church-
government?

Are not the two Testa-
ments expositors of the two
Tables? Do they leave us
any latitude in any other of
the Commandements? why
should we then think, that
That Commandement which
God hath honoured in the
second place, should be for-
gotten? Truly, had the
Learned Papists so done,
they would never have ex-
punged it.

Are not we as unable to
prescribe the *manner* as the
matter of Gods worship? If
we were left to our selves,
should wee not institute
cringings, crouchings, all
those ceremonies of *will-*
worship, which carry a vo-
luntary

The ill
conse-
quence of
the divisi-
on be-
tween do-
ctrine and
discipline.

Doctrin
of matter
in worship;
Discipline
of manner,
both are
Doctrin,
both pre-
scribed by
the same
God.

The mon-
strous ef-
fects of
division
made ma-
nifest in
other pei-
ces of Di-
vinity.

Inntary outward visible shew
of humility, but give the
heart leave to play the
Trewant? If ever distincti-
ons did harm, here they have
beene deadly poyson: for,
Doctrin and Discipline are
all one. For, what is *Dis-
cipline* but that Doctrin
of the manner of Gods wor-
ship? wherein we ought to
bee as faithfull, as in any
point of Divinity: and this
will certainly appeare one
day, when God shall with
pittyleffe holy scorne, aske
some, Who hath required
these things at your hands?

But, to conclude; give
me leave to shew you how
these exorbitant wits have
raised a *Babel*, have cast *Pe-
lion* upon *Ossa*; and from
thence discharged the Ba-
listæ

listæ of their ignorance, against the Throne of Eternity, against God himselfe.

The Schooles for many ages, have looked upon the way of Gods knowledge of things, under two notions; *simplicis intelligentia*, & *pura visionis*. I confesse, I see not the end of this distinction. For, if Gods *Power* and *Will* be all one, (which I think no man disputeth) all the wayes of knowledge, that can bee in God, must bee confined in that one notion of *simplicis intelligentia*.

I doe seeme (if I mistake not) to maintaine this position by an evident demonstration, thus;

Is there any that denyeth God to be *purus actus*? doth

not

The weaknesse of the distinction *Scientia simplicis intelligentia*, & *pura visionis*.

not every body say, that in God there is no *potentia*? If God then bee *actus*, and not *potentia*, all things were, that ever shall be, *ab aeterno* under a decree; and so, what hee could doe, hee did doe, and can doe no more.

Yet, that Truths may come more cleerely and easily to our apprehension, I shall allow the use of the distinction, so that they improve it only for *memory*, and doe not expect any *reality* from it.

But some, not content with this distinction, have found out another, which discovereth a meane parentage, by the very name, it is called *Media scientia*. I will not contend with it in the

*Scientia
media dis-
cussed.*

the power of those arguments, whereby our Divines have so often left it spiritlesse and helplesse. I shall only from this point of Unity, shew the vanity of it.

If this *sciencia* be one with that which wee allow, then is it but nominall and vaine. If it be different, you make two in God: for, if I over-value not my former ratiocination, I have proved it cleerely that *scientia simplicis intelligentie* carrieth forth as much of God as is discernable to our darknesse; and making two in God, you exalt two Gods; and whilst you finde two Gods, you lose the true God, which is but only one, an eternall Unity. And thus whilst men gaze
conti-

continually in search of causes, they blinde themselves, and know not effects.

CHAP. XVII.

A Recapitulation of former instances, with some additions of a question or two more.

In what sense intermediate causes may be allowed.

In Confesse there is a secondary intermediate Being, which you may call a *Cause*; which in our language, doth precede and produce another; the observation of which, is very fitting, so that wee search and puzzle not our selves with the grounds and Reasons of this precedency.

As,

As, apply fire to combustible matter, and it will burn; and if you call (which in some sense you may call) this application, the cause of burning: I dispute not onely the search into the nature of wood and fire, and how the fire doth work upon the wood, and how the wood can be both passive and active, *Simul & Semel*; for, they say, *Nulla est actio quin sit reactio*, this is That I desire to shun; for, *intus exstans prohibet alienum*; whilst we entertain our selves with these poore Sophismes of wit, we lose that glory which the immortall soule thirsts after.

But if our spirits, and the light of our reason be dim;
Let us goe to the forge of
the

Division
the policy
of the
Prince of
darknesse.

the Philistines, and sharpen our inventions, our apprehensions there; Let us learn from the Prince of the aire, who (knowing well, that, dissolve the *fasciculus*, and *Iugurtha* his prophecy to his children will prove true) taught his Scholars this lesson for these many ages, *Divide & impera; Divisions and distractions, being the great road of all error.*

And if you long, with the Israelites, to have a King, as your neighbours have; and you desire to speak in their language: When the soule entertaineth light, say it doth *understand*. When it doth exercise any morall vertue, say it *willeth*. When you see some things preceede others, call the one a *cause,*

cause, the other an effect: but
travell not far in the search
of the source of this cause.
Doe not make the *will* and
the *understanding* two facul-
ties, *Fratrum concordia rara;*
Jacob will supplant *Esau* in
the Womb. Make there-
fore the severall Actings of
the soule, as Rayes of this
one soule; make these rayes,
and the soule sending forth
these rayes, a perpetuall e-
manation Divine: and so
by these degrees of truth,
mount up into the armes of
Eternity, and he will take
care of you, that you shall
not dash your feet against
the stone of *free will*: that
you shall not overthrow all
faith, by starting so many
nice questions in the point
of faith.

Recapitu-
lation of
all.

If

Division
the policy
of the
Prince of
darknesse.

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nice questions in the point
of faith.

Recapitu-
lation of
all.

If

If you follow this rule, and see all things in the glasse of Unity, you will not lose all Arts and Sciences in the Wood of Divisions and Subdivisions *in infinitum*; you shall be more substantiall, than to make Substance and Accidents Two; neither will it ever happen, that you maintaine transubstantiation, by affirming that Accidents can *herere in nullo subjecto*.

You shall not make to your selfe a God of contradiction, dividing the *will* and *power* of God. Both which in God, is God; and so but *one*. You will not maintaine two Covenants, one of workes, another of grace, seeing grace is gracelesse without workes, and
Works

Works worthlesse without grace.

If God shall give you to walke by this light, practi-
call questions will be laid
aside, as well as Theoreti-
call : you will not dispute
whether you ought to be
more holy on one day (as
at a Sacrament) then at o-
ther times ; for, you will
then know, that these Scrip-
tures expresse fully the rule
you must walke by ; *Pray
continually; rejoyce evermore:
blessed is he that feareth al-
wayes : Be ye holy [not by fits
and starts, but] as I am holy;
serving me alwayes, with all
your heart, your might, your
affections. So that every day,
every duty, is to you an
holy day, an ordinance di-
vine.*

And

The sense
of the
Sabbaths
command.

And if any man shall say,
Why doth God adde this
parcell, *Remember that thou
keep holy the Sabbath day, &c.*
and this strict injunction,
before you approach the
Table of the Lord, *Let every
man examine himselfe, and so
let him eat?*

You will be able to an-
swer, that you ought not to
be more holy in one day, in
one duty, than in another;
for, you must be all one, *Sem-
per idem.*

And secondly, you will
be able to prove, that the
weight of this injunction, is
not to adde any other holi-
nesse to the day, or the ordi-
nance, than a holinesse of se-
paration.

For, a holinesse of inhæ-
rence, cannot fall any
where,

where, but upon a reasonable creature. The Temple had no more.

For, with the leave of learned and holy Master *Cawdry*, Time & Place are incapable of any other sanctification.

But the stresse of these and the like precepts, lyeth here. We ought indeed alwayes to keepe a Sabbath. Every bread and every water, ought to be a confirmation of our faith and of our graces.

But God considering that we are lower than the Angels (and them hee hath charged with folly;) that we are infirme; that we cannot alwayes keep the bow bent: If we cannot be holy all the weeke, if we cannot be pure at our own Tables; as who can?

All things
Ordinances.

The intention of speciall Ordinances.

can? yet, if we will remember the Sabbath, and if wee will come to that feast of marrow and fatnesse with a wedding-garment, and at other times doe our best (though weak) indeavours, he will behold no iniquity in us.

We shall not be perplexed, how farre we ought to mourne for the sinnes of others, the sinnes of the times, or our owne lives. [And these are intangling questions to many sweet spirits.] For, drawing all things to an unity, we shall know that sorrow and joy may meet in the same subject at once; they must be both in the actings of faith. Wee must not sorrow as without hope; We may not lose

Mourning
and joy
reconciled.

lose our Faith in our teares;
Our teares must be teares of
joy; Wee may think, that
we have sinned, and so sigh;
but at the same instant, wee
must know we have a Savi-
our, and so triumph. And if
I were now all gore blood,
would I not now goe to the
Chirurgians? Truly the grea-
ter my sin, the sooner ought
to be my return, the higher
my Faith. But great and
inlarged Faith, cannot be
without exultation and ma-
gnificats.

Thus could we lay aside
foolish questions, could we
seek into our hearts, accor-
ding to the Poets advice,
Ne te quaesiveris extra, and
not into the causes, and the
Being of causes, things too
high for us; We might have

I

an

an Heaven here, we might see how Christ is one with G O D, and wee one with Christ ; so wee in Christ, one with God.

If wee cannot reach the perfection of this knowledge, yet let us come as neere it as we can, for the true knowledge of God in Christ, is life everlasting.

(.:.)

28 MR 59

A



A Postscript.

AN D now, Sir, I have with what brevity I can, run through, what I never intended to speake of. I had prepared a little in lieu of This, upon the nature of *Prophecy*, which I now shall reserve for a Discourse upon the fourteenth Chapter of the second to Corinth: But it was with me in this case, as it is with the soule, prostrating it selfe at the throne of grace. It designes to breath it selfe out in confession, but is suddenly raised up in-

to sweet exultation. It intends a *Magnificat*, but by some unexpected irresistible power, it is dissolved into teares; which never did, nor ever can happen in a *Forme*, as might appeare by ventilating the opposit arguments, if opportunity prevailed as well as reason.

I had nothing in my resolution, but, by a word or two, to mediate in the behalfe of these lines, a free and a friendly accessse, to Your more serious and usefull studies. But (*quo fato nescio*) I have let fall my plummet into waters too deepe, that if you lend not your favourable construction in the perusall, I must suffer. I confesse my confidence in your Gentlenesse is great;

great ; I shall therefore, without any further plea, after this long Parenthesis, give you a short accompt of what these papers beare.

You have here my poore thoughts upon the twenty-fourth Chap. of *Matth.* that I was forced to, because I quote it, more than once, in sense differing from our Commentators : yea, I was necessitated to run through the whole Chapter. It will appeare in costly robes, adorned with lofty and glorious language, sweetned by many a pleasant and cleare Simile, quickned by divers acute and learned Criticisms : *These, none of these are mine* : My Cabinet enshrineth no such Treasure. I confesse, to save the labour

*Matth. 24

bout of contending with *Parens*, and others, I delivered to a Friend of Yours, and Mine, onely the *substratum* of the Discourse, desiring him, from those principles to undertake my adversaries. In lieu of this, he returned me the *Chapter* *, imbellished with so much wit and learning, that I durst not call it mine, and so thought to have suppressed it ; and Had done so, but that from the Law of friendship, you may challenge a share in what is His; and from that reason it lieth now, and is presented to Your view, hoping (for his sake, not for mine) to finde grace in your eyes.

You have also, my Thoughts, upon the twentieth

tieth of *Revelations*, because therein I have done Two things.

First, According to my Modell, answered your three *Queries*.

Secondly, Discovered my opinion concerning the *Millenaries*. I finde That point entertained by many learned and pious men, under various and different notions.

Various
sorts of
*Millenar-
ies*.

The *first* who were of that opinion, lived immediately after *S^t. Iohn*, as *Papias*, *Irenaeus*, and so on; in after ages, *Tertullian*, *Cyprian*, *Augustine*, *cum multis alijs*: these men did a little *Alcoranize*; for, with *Mahomet*, they cast all the glory of it, into the outward pomp the Church should then enjoy:

The first
too ear-
nall.

which is but as the body of that other spirituall beauty, wherein the Church of God shall at that time be more than exceedingly resplendent. Yet these men have happily fixed upon the due Season, expecting them at the pouring out of the *seventh Vial*, a thousand yeares before the end of the World.

The second only
Spirituell.

Of latter dayes, most famous and glorious Lights, as *Calvin, Beza, Iunius, Tremelius, Broughton, &c.* have wrapt up all the glory under a *spirituall notion*, robbing both it and other Scriptures, of that sweetness; whereon even *Our Soules*, but especially *Our children* shall feed as upon Marrow and Fatnesse; where-

wherewith we shall be refreshed as with Wine refined upon the lees. *Contraries* may sometimes (in some sense) be *Errors*; the *others* erred because they have not the *spirituall*; and *these* have mistaken, not observing the *temporall* glory of this thousand yeares.

These last men are succeeded by a generation of Worthies, who have come nearer to the Truth; yet (if I mistake not) have missed it; and some of these are *Alstedius*, (who justly meriteth the Anagram of *Sedulitas*) *Mede*, and some others; who indeed expect a time of glory, confuting the first men, because they made theirs too carnall

A third sort, in some things too literal!

carnall. Yet doe they faile themselves, by placing the time after the burning of the world with materiall fire, spoken of in *Peter*; and joyning with it their opinion, of the resurrection of the Martyrs, which I do not wholly condemne, though therein I am not yet so cleere.

Lastly, we have the Reverend man Mr. *Brightman*, against whom I will not now dispute, whose opinion, seeing I must oppose it, when I mention it, I will not now name. For hee ought always à me non sine honore nominari. *Pliny* saith *Venerabilis Catonis ebrietas*, and so say I of *Brightman*, The very Errors (if errors) of *Brightman* have

have their *beauty*: I must confesse, if God hath been pleased to discover light to me, I have borrowed from him. If there be any thing of sweet, I have gathered it from the strong. And I do seriously protest I have not with *Scaliger* the Souldier; undertaken *Cardan*, that his ruines may be my rise.

No, no, I honour his very Urne, and do beleve that one day I shall see the Jews very zealous in raising to him some stately *Mausoleum*, who hath been the first meanes of quickning the affections of Christians to pray for their returne.

Sir, I have overtired your Gentlenesse, and your Patience.

tience, therefore now give me leave to refresh your spirits ; Let me in a word say here, what I prove more amply elsewhere ; the days are at hand ; We shall see the Laying of the *first stone*, if not the rearing of the structure to some good height.

I know there is a Great Reader, who, though he hath *Lynx* his eyes, yet using overmuch the Septuagenary Spectacles of antique Antiquity, loseth to himselfe, and, by his justly-merited authority, robbeth others of, this sweet truth, of the Church her approaching glory, which is in my apprehension, as *blood* to the veines, as *life* to the blood, as *spirit* to the life,

life, as *all* to the Spirit. But certainly, while he thinketh the *witnesses*, to be yet unburied, hee doth bury two witnesses, which are as able to bring Christ to his Espousals, as the two post-knights were to naile him to the Crosse.

I know there is another worthy, who hath for many yeares stayed Christs fainting Spouse with flagons of Generous and Good Wine, who adjourneth our happinesse by expecting the sad downfull of the two *witnesses*. But (as I have, I hope, cleerely proved elsewhere) That is past. *Macte ergo gaudio*, Tune up your ten-stringed instrument : Let us heare that pleasant melody of a Christian

stian Hymen; O Hymenæe!
 Let Your sweet spirit sing,
 and We will dance: For
 certainly ere long, all teares
 shall be wiped away from
 our eyes, and perfect frui-
 tion of Love will cast out
 Feare.

*And now, I commit You, and
 Your Hopefull, Flourishing Stu-
 dies, to the expectation, and
 advancement of these glories
 which make way for
 the coming of our
 Saviour.*

28 MR 59

And to Him alone
 be the glory

FINIS.



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in this TREATISE
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